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Biological diversity, a term that encapsulates all of life – the diversity of plants and animals 
and the places they live, has changed the way we think about nature conservation. The 
conservation of biodiversity demands that we understand the role of natural systems and 
ecological processes in sustaining landscapes. Landscapes and the issues embedded within 
them vary enormously from the protection of remote wilderness areas to maintaining the 
productivity of agricultural regions and the quality of life within cities. 
 
This report seeks to answer questions from an outsider’s perspective about the roles 
central government, regional councils and  the non-government sector should play in 
conserving biodiversity; how effective working partnerships with landholders should be 
developed; what the most appropriate policy mix is; and who should fund biodiversity 
conservation programmes.   It draws on Australian and international experience in the 
management of biodiversity. 
 
In consultations with officials and stakeholders mixed views were expressed on whether 
holistic approaches to biodiversity conservation are required or whether a model of 
protection through dedicated public and private (covenanted) conservation reserves will be 
sufficient.  The view taken in this report is that protection is necessary but not sufficient. 
Ultimately on-ground programmes are required that target and reward land managers who 
actively manage areas of indigenous biodiversity on their land. However, it is also necessary 
to understand the economic and social factors that are driving the land-uses and 
management practices that are causing the continuing loss of biodiversity.  
 
Successful approaches to biodiversity conservation require coordinated responses from all 
scales of management.  The critical role of regional planning in balancing the need for 
scientific assessment, leadership and centralised planning from the “top down”  with 
strategies for engaging landholders and local communities from the “bottom up” is 
highlighted. The  Resource Management Act 1991  (RMA)  provides a solid framework for 
developing effective regional responses. However the challenges of coordination across 
spheres of government, clarification of regulation and engaging the non-government sector 
remain. A number of policy options, such as funding and tax incentives and capacity 
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New Zealand is at a cross roads in the management of its biological diversity – its most
precious and valuable natural asset.
The New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy was released in February 2000 outlining an ambitious
work programme that is targeted at halting the decline of indigenous biodiversity. Significant
funding increases to biodiversity related programmes have been made in the Budget. A
Ministerial Committee is reporting to Government on the role of private land in conserving
biodiversity.
A number of important questions are being asked:
•  Can pests and weeds be effectively managed?
•  What role should central government be playing in biodiversity conservation?
•  Should regional councils be taking the lead?
•  How can the non-government sector be engaged?
•  How can effective working partnerships with landholders be developed?
•  What is the most appropriate policy mix?
•  Who should fund biodiversity conservation programmes?
This report seeks to answer these questions from an outsiders perspective drawing on
Australian and international experience in the management of biodiversity. It is one input to
an ongoing debate on how to most effectively conserve biodiversity in New Zealand.
CHALLENGES INBIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION?
New Zealand has a unique biodiversity shaped by over 80 million years of isolation and its
comparatively recent human settlement. This means that many species of plants and animals
are endemic – that is they are only found within New Zealand. Many are in sharp decline,
from the impacts of human activity and introduced plants and animals.
In the past approaches to nature conservation have focussed on the creation and management
of national parks and other public reserves for protection of areas important for water, soils
and biodiversity conservation. Biodiversity conservation demands considerably more from all
sectors of the community. Key challenges identified include:
•  Recognising and accounting for the functional role of biodiversity in providing
ecosystem services that support all land-uses ranging from agricultural
production to nature conservation.
•  Integrating biodiversity conservation across different land tenures and with other
natural resource management objectives including pest, weed and catchment
management.
•  Successfully engaging private landholders, particularly in lowland and coastal
environments where the most vulnerable and fragmented ecosystems are
located.
•  Managing across scales and clarifying the role of different tiers of government.
These challenges are acknowledged in the New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy. However,
there remain significant impediments to the adoption of new approaches. In our consultations
with officials and stakeholders mixed views have been expressed on whether holistic
approaches to biodiversity conservation are required or whether a model of protection through
dedicated public and private (covenanted) conservation reserves will be sufficient.Executive Summary
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The view taken in this report is that protection is necessary but not sufficient. Ultimately on-
ground programmes are required that target and reward land managers who actively manage
areas of indigenous biodiversity on their land – be it private or public land. However, it has
been revealed that the pathway to this outcome is rather more complex. Rather than focussing
exclusively on land managers, it is necessary to understand the economic and social factors
that are driving the land-uses and management practices that are causing the continuing loss
of biodiversity.
INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
Successful approaches to biodiversity conservation require coordinated responses from all
scales of management. At a national scale broad objectives are set and defined. At regional
and local scales these broad objectives are interpreted in the context of local circumstances.
Finally at property and paddock scales pragmatic decisions are made about management
needs and how these can be dealt with on the ground.
The critical role of regional planning in balancing the need for scientific assessment,
leadership and centralised planning from the “top down” with strategies for engaging
landholders and local communities from the “bottom up” is highlighted. The Resource
Management Act 1991(RMA) provides a solid framework for developing effective regional
responses to natural resource management. However, a number of critical challenges remain.
Coordination across spheres of government It is not possible to develop a single
model that clarifies roles and responsibilities of the different tiers of governments for
biodiversity management. District and regional councils have different capacities and
willingness to conserve biodiversity in different regions. Responsibility is shared and
concurrent. There is a critical challenge for central government in resourcing and
building the capacity of poorer regions.
Clarification of regulations There is great uncertainty over the responsibilities of
landholders in protecting and managing indigenous biodiversity. A careful balance
must be struck between regulation and voluntary stewardship by landholders.
Ultimately certainty can only be delivered through strengthened regional and local
planning structures. The issue lies in managing the transition with central government
needed to provide leadership in programme design, funding incentives and capacity
building.
Engaging the non-government sector A number of organisations, most notably the
QEII National Trust, are effectively engaging landholders and delivering biodiversity
conservation at arms length from government. However, a different challenge is to
engage non-landholders in biodiversity conservation, particularly urban New
Zealanders. A number of policy opportunities ranging from tax incentives to formal
government-business partnerships are identified.Executive Summary




The importance of using a balance of policy instruments covering the full suite of
instruments: education and motivation, financial incentives and land-use regulation is
highlighted. This raises a number of challenges as the policy debate has been dominated by
consideration of regulatory instruments in recent years.
Facilitating Landholder Stewardship The importance of one-on-one extension with
private land managers is highlighted. It is noted that farms are managed holistically,
meaning that conservation programmes must be integrated with other natural resource
and farm management objectives. A number of organisations are providing effective
landholder facilitation. However, these are under-resourced and require further
support.
Sharing Costs with Land Managers Incentives for secure protection of high
conservation value sites are in place and operating relatively effectively. However, a
critical gap lies in providing incentives to share the cost of biodiversity management
with private landholders. This is a critical gap that must be filled.
Developing Model Programmes There are many examples of innovative policies
and programmes for biodiversity conservation. There is an urgent need to document
these, develop model policies and promote their uptake more broadly.
Broadening Options for Land Managers Land managers are generally required to
enter “in perpetuity” conservation covenants prior to receiving incentives. To
facilitate greater landholder uptake there may be a role for smaller incentives to be
tied to voluntary non-binding or fixed term agreements.1
MEASURING SUCCESS
Policies for biodiversity conservation seek to achieve a number of objectives including:
building institutional capacity, engagement of the private sector; raising landholder awareness
and strategic investment in on-ground works. Given these multiple objectives a range of
social, economic and environment indicators will be required to measure the success of
biodiversity policy and programs.
However, above all else monitoring must be pragmatic and outcomes focused. A conceptual
framework for adaptive management and policy learning is put forward highlighting the
critical role of research and development in improving our ability to manage through time.
CONCLUSION
All of the elements of a successful approach to biodiversity management in New Zealand are
evolving. The Biodiversity Strategy represents a shift in emphasis toward more integrated
management of New Zealand’s landscapes.
The challenge for governments is to create an environment where innovative policies and
organisations are actively supported, grown and transferred to other regions. This is
essentially a role of capacity building, a role that will remain a critical challenge for central
government for a number of years.
1 It is noted that demand for in perpetuity covenants from the QEII National Trust is outstripping their
capacity to deliver. The issue of adequate resources will need to be addressed.Policy Options




INSTITUTIONS FOR MANAGING BIODIVERSITY
Policy Option 1 – Integrating approaches to biodiversity conservation
The framework of a Conservation Management Network is adopted to coordinate
management responses to biodiversity conservation across all land tenures.
•  Processes are put in place to ensure biodiversity values are integrated into existing
natural resource management and statutory land-use planning processes; and
•  Regional data-bases recording the status of and existing conservation efforts to
manage key ecosystems across all land tenures are put in place;
•  A progressive review of public land classifications are put in place with emphasis
placed on pragmatically resolving issues of regional and district land management
responsibilities;
•  Linkages are made with the research community to ensure the development of
conservation priorities is undertaken on a scientific basis.
Policy Option 2 – Clarifying roles and responsibilities
Consistent with the framework of the Resource Management Act 1991, clear responsibility is
given to regional councils for the coordination of strategic planning for biodiversity
conservation in an integrated fashion with other natural resource management issues. This
will require increased commitment from all spheres of government over the next 3 –5 years.
•  There is an urgent need to facilitate and build the capacity of regions to
successfully integrate biodiversity management into their existing natural resource
management objectives.
•  Central government should actively monitor land-clearing rates across New
Zealand to guide future policy development in this area.
Policy Option 3 – Building institutional capacity
Incentives that build institutional capacity will be required to give district and regional
councils access to and the ability to implement the full suite of tools required to achieve the
outcomes established in the Biodiversity Strategy.
•  A small team of facilitators is employed to provide advice and expertise on
biodiversity planning and programme design to local governments and non-
government organisations operating at a regional scale.
•  A contestable fund is established to which local governments can apply to
implement innovative programmes for biodiversity management. The programme
would provide establishment funding for 3 years after which the programmes
would be required to become self-funding.Policy Options
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Draft Policy Option 4 – Engaging the non-government sector
Given the emergent nature of the role of the non-government sector and private investment in
conservation activities in New Zealand there is a need to review existing arrangements, to
identify and address impediments to private investment and to foster opportunities for large-
scale partnerships which deliver effective leverage of scarce public sector funding.
Consideration could be given to:
•  increasing support for voluntary conservation programmes to meet the demand of
landholders wishing to enter conservation covenants;
•  establishing a roundtable between relevant ministers and community and business
leaders to review existing arrangements and facilitate engagement of the non-
government sector, with particular focus on urban New Zealanders;
•  reviewing taxation arrangements to provide positive incentives for environmental
philanthropy and the creation of private conservation reserves; and
•  review property rates to confirm the capacity of local government to provide
ongoing exemptions to land covered by a conservation covenant.
POLICY TOOLKIT
Policy Option 5 – Facilitating landholder stewardship
In order to achieve greater uptake of biodiversity conservation programmes by land managers
it is recommended that a network of landholder facilitators be established to provide advice
and facilitate access to incentives for on-ground works.
•  A review of existing extension services available to landholders is required to
determine how existing resources can be most effectively targeted to a more
integrated service across all public policy objectives, including biodiversity.
•  Where new services are required, the provision of these services should be
contestable and preferably delivered at arms length from government.
•  Facilitation networks should be closely aligned to any financial incentives (see
finance).
Policy Option 6 – Incentives fund
To support the transition to sustainable management of indigenous biodiversity on private
land, a new contestable incentive fund is established or the scope of existing funds is
broadened.
•  The fund would be linked to existing funds aimed at securing protection of high
priority lands for the Conservation Management Network (Policy Option 1).
•  The fund would also provide catalytic funding for the establishment of new
programmes by regional and district councils (see draft Policy Option 3).Policy Options
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Policy Option 7 – Model regional regulation, incentive and facilitation programmes
To facilitate improved design and acceptance of regulation at regional and local scales, best
practice and model programmes are developed and widely disseminated to all local
governments to facilitate early uptake of new and innovative approaches to biodiversity
management.
•  The model programmes could be tied to the capacity building and catalytic
incentives fund described in Policy Options 3 and 6.
Policy Option 8 – Broadening the suite of management agreements
To facilitate greater voluntary uptake of property agreements and covenanting programmes a
range of fixed term and non-binding agreements are developed and made available to
landholders.
•  Fixed term agreements (10 years) may be appropriate for catalytic funding for
improved management such as fencing or pest control
•  A non-binding programme modeled on the Land for Wildlife programme may
encourage greater landholder uptake and stewardship.
MONITORING AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Draft Policy Option 9 – Measuring success
To ensure that scarce funds are invested wisely it is recommended that all programmes funded
under the Biodiversity Strategy have clear project objectives and performance indicators
associated with them to facilitate learning and improved programme design and delivery over
time.Purpose of consultancy
Conserving Biodiversity -– Institutions, Policies and Incentives
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PURPOSE OF THIS CONSULTANCY
The purpose of this consultancy is to identify institutional structures and policy options for
delivering the objectives of the New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy. The policy options to be
evaluated include facilitation and education mechanisms, financial incentives and regulatory
frameworks. Particular priority is to be given to options for engaging the community and land
managers in biodiversity conservation.
TERMS OF REFERENCE
The CSIRO Wildlife and Ecology, Australia will provide a report by 31 July 2000 that will
address the following:
1. Explore approaches from a practical perspective for encouraging broad
participation and community contributions towards desired outcomes including:
•  Factors that may make private sector and community participation work or not
work. In particular:
- How government can encourage and assist individual and community
participation;
- How individuals and interest groups could get others involved; and
- Whether there is a role for government at the local level to encourage
participation.
•  Approaches that encourage and enable innovation of New Zealand's management
of biodiversity.
•  Implications for the design of self-organising and self-governing institutions.
This reference requires the development of a conceptual framework for the New Zealand
Government to develop partnerships with landholders, community groups and other
stakeholders for on-ground management of biodiversity. Of particular interest is how
authority and responsibility can be effectively devolved to regions in a way that empowers
and resources local communities to take action that is consistent with the strategic objectives
of the Biodiversity Strategy.
To deliver against this reference, a model for developing partnerships and devolving power
and responsibility to regional and local scales will be developed. This will take account of the
existing legislative and policy structures for natural resource management in New Zealand
including the role of regional councils established under the Resource Management Act 1991.
The model will be developed in a manner that seeks to foster innovation and the development
of resilient and adaptive institutions at a local scale.
The role of government in fostering and creating institutions with these capacities will be the
focus.Purpose of consultancy
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2. Identify and provide an assessment of the mechanisms available to encourage
private conservation initiatives. In particular:
•  Financial incentives for private landowners (including compensation within a
property rights framework).
•  Communication. The need to provide relevant, timely and consistent information
(skills, level of targeting, method of delivery etc.) to deliver it effectively.
•  Any other mechanisms and how they could be applied.
This reference will be addressed by identifying the range of policies and programmes
available to conserve biodiversity. A particular focus will be on how to effectively integrate
education/motivational incentives, financial incentives and regulatory mechanisms. The
rationale for this approach lies in evidence that a suite of policy tools are required to engage
landholders and motivate private conservation in a cost effective manner. Once again,
emphasis will be placed on identifying innovative measures for engaging landholders and the
private sector in sharing the costs of biodiversity conservation with government.
This component of the project will draw on experience from Australia and overseas.
3. Provide input to assist with a review of existing mechanisms to best coordinate the
actions of:
•  Central and local government;
•  Central government, local government and the community; and
•  Programmes that run across agencies and how these can best be managed.
Officials involved in the New Zealand Biodiversity Working Group (the “Officials”) will be
undertaking the review. The Contractor will provide advice based on the Australian
experience to provide a sound basis for more detailed work in this area. Discussions with key
New Zealand contacts (to be advised by the Crown) during the one-week visit in May will be
used to inform this process.
4. Identify best practice based on overseas experience. In particular, Australia,
Canada, United States, United Kingdom and private land in European countries.
Identify:
•  The common elements.
•  What has worked and why? And what has not worked and why?
A brief overview of international experience will be provided in addressing component two of
the project. The focus will be on what can be learned from other country’s experience. It
should be noted that, as agriculture is heavily subsidised in both Europe and the United States,
the level of incentive/compensation paid to landholders is much greater than that being
considered in either New Zealand or Australia.
In this context best practice examples will be drawn on and highlighted in the context of
individual instruments identified in the second component of the project.Purpose of consultancy
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5. Advice on the development of a proposed structure to encourage and co-ordinate
the actions of central government, local government and the community. This work will
be linked to the work on the "BioWhat?" report, and will draw on material and
consultation undertaken for that project.
The design of institutional structures for biodiversity management across all spheres of
government will be a core component of this project (see section 1 and 3). The work provided
in this project will provide a solid basis for officials addressing this reference in detail.
Discussions with key New Zealand contacts (to be advised by the Crown) during the one-
week visit in May will be used to inform this process.
IMPORTANT ISSUES NOT ADDRESSED BY THE CONSULTANCY
The New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy is a comprehensive document addressing terrestrial,
fresh water and marine biodiversity. The focus of this consultancy is to provide insights from
Australian and international experience in relation to the issues of institutional structures and
community participation and engagement.
Its focus is on the management of terrestrial ecosystems. To the extent that land management
directly impacts freshwater and marine ecosystems, these issues are addressed. An important
gap, however, relates to the management of these environments, particularly in relation to
fisheries management. It is noted that these issues are the subject of a comprehensive report of
the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment.
Most importantly, this consultancy has limited advice on the management of iwi and hapu
interests in biodiversity. This is because of the limited experience and expertise of the authors
- not because the issues are unimportant. Some of the concepts developed in this paper will be
of relevance to establishing partnerships for conservation management. Where possible
reference is made to relevant programmes such as the Nga Whenua Rahui. In our view it is
best to recognise that we do not have expertise in this area and acknowledge that. However, it
is recognised that the discussion of these issues is far from adequate and the findings of this
report must be read in that light.
Management of genetic resources is also not addressed in this consultancy. The issues
surrounding ownership and management of intellectual and genetic property are beyond the
scope of the review.
The management of the existing estate of public conservation reserves is addressed to a
limited extent. However, issues surrounding the detail and adequacy of existing arrangements
are not.
Finally, the report is largely silent on the role of information, data and science in directing the
process of priority setting for biodiversity management. The role of local communities and
stakeholders in participating and contributing local knowledge on biodiversity issues is,
however, addressed. This gap is purposeful, as the focus is on the implementation
programmes that draw on information and research on biodiversity issues. The links between
programme design, information and monitoring are discussed at some length.Purpose of consultancy




This consultancy has drawn extensively on the research findings of a three year CSIRO
project that has evaluated opportunities for the use of incentive based instruments for the
conservation of native vegetation in Australia.2
The approach taken has been to provide a synthesis of the findings of the above project and
assess their application to the New Zealand situation. This has involved:
•  A desk top review of institutional issues and policy instruments relevant to the
conservation of biodiversity – drawing on both Australian and international
experience;
•  Consultation with key researchers and decision makers in New Zealand to refine the
review and develop recommendations;
•  Submission of a draft report; and
•  Incorporation of comments from agencies and stakeholders in New Zealand into
final report.
2 The project was funded by the Commonwealth of Australia’s Land Water Resources Research and
Development Corporation and Environment Australia.Introduction




The management of biodiversity is a complex task. Whilst the concept biodiversity – the
variety of all life and the physical environment in which life is found – is simple and all
embracing, it is the intersection between biodiversity and human systems that is complex.
Biodiversity pervades our everyday life to the extent that products directly derived from
living organisms feed, clothe and shelter us. Indeed the functions performed by natural
systems underpin the production of most of the goods of services that humans value.
Examples of the services provided by biodiversity include nutrient cycling in soils,
pollination, and the assimilation of wastes to provide clean water. More indirectly
biodiversity provides services not as closely associated with the natural world, such as
medicines and other high technologies (Daily, 1997). Further, industrialisation and
urbanisation have made the connections between our everyday actions and biodiversity
increasingly indirect. This is a critical because ultimately the economic and social drivers of
society are the cause of the loss of biodiversity.
The term “threatening processes” is used to describe a wide range of physical processes and
human activities that cause the loss or decline of biological diversity: that is loss in the
diversity of genes, species and ecosystems. It is useful to distinguish between the various
pressures or drivers that cause the loss of biodiversity. It is important to differentiate between
the actual process that threatens biodiversity, the land-uses that contribute to this process and
social and economic factors that drive these land-uses. For example, it is land-uses such as
forestry or agriculture that are often cited as a threatening process, whereas it is the activities
associated with these land-uses that ultimately cause a decline in biodiversity. Table 1
distinguishes between different categories of threatening processes drawing on the work of
the OECD (1996) and Young et al. (1996).
Direct threatening processes: relate to the physical and natural processes through
which biodiversity values are lost or eroded through time. They include a wide range
of factoring ranging from clearing of small areas of indigenous native, the impacts of
pests and weeds, to the impact of global processes such as climate change.
Land-uses: identify the human activity that is likely to lead to one of the direct
causes of biodiversity loss.
Underlying causes: relate to our ability to reflect biodiversity values in markets and
decisions made by governments. A failure to take biodiversity values into account
when developing a strategic land-use plan would be an example of a potential policy
failure.
Fundamental causes: relate to those factors that are often thought to be beyond our
control, but which have a profound impact on the decisions that ultimately drive
biodiversity loss.
Table 1: The processes that threaten biodiversity
Direct threatening
process
Land-use Underlying causes Fundamental
causes
•  habitat modification
or destruction
•  habitat fragmentation
•  over harvesting of
species
•  environmental change






•  lack of
information
•  market failure
•  policy failure
•  population growth
•  inequality
•  economic growth
•  consumption
patternsIntroduction
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The fact that such a wide range of factors, which operate at different scales, drive biodiversity
loss demonstrates that strategies for the management of biodiversity are complex and are
linked to our everyday actions and activities.
Indeed in addressing the fundamental causes of biodiversity loss the OECD concluded:
“Policies which attempt to conserve biodiversity without addressing the fundamental
pressure that cause biodiversity loss cannot succeed in the long run.” (OECD 1996)
This is particularly relevant in the context of planning for the conservation of biodiversity at a
national scale. The first and most important role that policy makers can make to is to address
the impacts and pressures that economic production and consumption have on biodiversity.
This involves ensuring that impacts on biodiversity are integrated with other policies,
including economic and social policies. This is essentially the challenge of sustainable
development.
However, a range of the underlying and fundamental causes of biodiversity loss such as
population growth and wealth distribution are intractable at a local, regional or even national
level. Further, it would be naive to presume that we can work to fully integrate biodiversity
into our decision-making and that this might suffice to address the underlying causes.
Integrated decision-making implies an ability to be able to incorporate consideration of the
values of biodiversity into market decisions, or in other terms to “get the price right”.
Tensions between economic activity and the objective of protecting natural ecosystems are
likely to continue in the long term.
This inherent tension can be alleviated by policies that target the direct pressure on
biodiversity, such as vegetation clearance. Successful approaches to the management of
biodiversity will therefore need to operate on a number of scales, ranging from national
policies that address underlying causes to specific on-ground responses to direct pressures on
particular sites.
Policies must also be applied across different land-use tenures, ranging from national parks,
and other public lands, through to leasehold and privately owned land. There are two reasons
why engaging private landholders in biodiversity conservation is a particularly important.
Firstly, conservation policy has traditionally focussed on the allocation of public lands and
neglected the fundamental role of private individuals; and secondly, private lands contain
many of our threatened ecological communities because they are located on fertile soils with
flatter topography where clearing and development has been most extensive. (New Zealand
Government, 2000; Pressy 1995).
Developing successful policies for the conservation of biodiversity needs to account for this
wide range of different conditions. This report addresses the issue of policy development in
the four sections, which follow this introduction.
Section 2 addresses institutional issues focussing on clarifying roles and
responsibilities between spheres of governments, the private sector and individual
landholders.
Section 3 introduces the full suite of policy tools available for conserving
biodiversity; ranging through education and motivation, financial incentives and
property right-based instruments.
Section 4 illustrates the application of the policy tools at different scales using a
number of Australian and international case studies.
Section 5 concludes the report by reviewing approaches to biodiversity management
against the principles developed in earlier sections. Key policy options for the New
Zealand Government in implementing its Biodiversity Strategy are identified.Institutions for managing biodiversity
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2. INSTITUTIONS FOR MANAGING 
BIODIVERSITY 
This section addresses the first term of reference of the consultancy and seeks to provide
guidance to officials tasked with the definition of new administrative frameworks and
coordinating mechanisms (covering components three and five of the terms of reference).
By institutions we mean the ways in which we (humans) organise ourselves. Institutions are
made up of formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (norms of
behaviour, conventions and self-imposed codes of conduct) and their enforcement
characteristics. Institutions thus shape the incentives in human exchange, whether political,
social, or economic. Institutions, such as property rights (the structure of rights to resources
and the rules under which those rights are exercised) are mechanisms people use to control
their use of the environment and behaviour toward each other (Folke, 1999).
Institutions have a profound effect on the ways in which native vegetation is managed. For
example, the legal framework within which local government operates is a major determinant
of how land-use planning and regulation can take place.
What is required is a review of existing arrangements and development of a conceptual
framework for the New Zealand Government to evolve existing institutions and develop
partnerships with landholders, community groups and other stakeholders who directly manage
the on-ground conservation of biodiversity. Of particular interest is how authority and
responsibility can be effectively devolved from central government to regions in a way that
empowers and resources local communities and the private sector to take action that is
consistent with the strategic objectives of government.
The section is structured as follows:
•  First, the roles and responsibilities of governments are explored, placing particular
emphasis on the role of action-oriented regional plans in bridging the gap between
national policy and local communities.
•  Second, the critical role of the non-government sector is discussed. This involves
developing innovative programmes and forging partnerships with individual
landholders.
•  Third, key principles are developed for devolving responsibility from central
government through development of regional biodiversity strategies.Institutions for managing biodiversity
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CSIRO Sustainable Ecosystems
16
2.1 CLARIFYING ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF
GOVERNMENT
A critical set of questions to be asked in developing successful institutional frameworks for
biodiversity management are:
•  At what scale should different processes and threats to biodiversity management be
managed?
•  Who should bear responsibility for managing biodiversity?
•  How should differing capacities for biodiversity management at local and regional
scales be taken into account?
2.1.1 The challenge of managing across scales
Figure 1 highlights the different scales at which biodiversity can be assessed and management
planned for – from both ecological and institutional perspectives. Conflicts in natural resource
management often arise because managers at different scales have differing objectives. For
example, a farmer or developer may be seeking to maximise the economic return from their
property while a land-use planner at local government or state level may be seeking to retain a
representative range of the different kinds of native vegetation found within the catchment.
Hence it is not possible to plan for the conservation of native vegetation at a single scale
































Figure 1: Different scales of ecological and institutional planning
Further, successful planning requires that the interrelationships between different natural
resources be explored. For example, in catchments experiencing significant pest and weedInstitutions for managing biodiversity
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problems the management of areas of natural habitat cannot easily be isolated from strategies
for pest management. Likewise, in an urban context, planning for the conservation of native
vegetation cannot take place in isolation from issues of recreation management and water
quality. In short, a holistic approach that integrates new strategies for conservation into
existing development and natural resource management programmes is more likely to be
successful.
Planning and involvement at each scale is necessary. To be effective the outcomes of
decisions at different scales should be integrated and reinforce each other.
•  At a national scale, decisions are made in relation to the objectives of natural
resource management and how these are to be balanced and integrated with other
social and economic objectives.
•  Planning at a regional scale provides an opportunity to evaluate natural resources
within natural boundaries that are relevant to meeting particular management
objectives, for example, catchments for water management or a bioregion for
biodiversity conservation. Planning and coordination at a regional scale allows
management objectives to be reconciled at a scale beyond that of the individual
landholding. For example, maintaining the variety of native plants and animals
within a region requires careful planning, particularly when native vegetation is
fragmented. Corridors that connect remnants are required, in addition to giving
priority to the types of habitat that are rare or required to sustain focal species
(Lambeck, 1999).
•  At the local scale it is possible to interpret the objectives of higher scales and
reconcile and apply them to local circumstances. At a local scale the immediate
concerns of the community may be most effectively voiced. The implications of
regional strategies can be determined and adjusted to meet local needs.
•  At the property and paddock scales, more pragmatic decisions are made about
management needs and how these can be dealt with ‘on the ground’. At this scale,
management guidelines and prescriptions are more likely to be accepted if they
are flexible. This is because different landholders have differing aspirations and
imperatives for the management of their land. If flexibility is provided,
landholders have the ability to be entrepreneurial and create innovative solutions
that strike a balance between conservation of threatened habitat, and maintenance
of the economic viability of the family farm. The critical importance of this scale
of management is reinforced by New Zealand’s culture and its legal institutions,
which emphasise a landholder’s entitlement to autonomously manage their land
within a framework of very broad constraints and obligations. 3
3 This is a general statement. It is acknowledged that some planning rules are quite prescriptive, such as
those relating to the conversion of pasture to pines in the 1970s.Institutions for managing biodiversity
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2.1.2 Who should bear responsibility for biodiversity management
The previous section demonstrated that managers at all scales must bear some responsibility
for biodiversity management. The challenge lies in developing approaches where the actions
of managers at each level are complementary and reinforce one another, rather than being in
conflict. This requires coordination and the development of cooperative partnerships.
Binning and Young (1997a) highlight the critical role of regional coordination in providing
the linkage between commitments to biodiversity conservation made at the national and state
level and planning for and implementation of strategies for on-ground works at a local level.
It is difficult, however, to develop clear divisions of responsibility as each tier of government
has an active interest in the performance of the management regime as a whole.
Young et al. (1996) have argued that these tensions can be resolved through the principle of
subsidiarity, that is, devolution of management responsibility to the individual or lowest
institutional level able to take effective action. Further, they recommend that no level of
government be able to reduce standards for management set by another level.
Campbell (1996) distinguishes between different scales of policy development and the role of
regional planning by distinguishing between the concepts of regionalism and regionalisation:
… there is a convergence [of policy development] from two directions, meeting at the
regional level. The bottom-up phenomenon is regionalism, and the top-down move to a
regional focus for program delivery is regionalisation. This is not an academic
distinction, as the imperatives driving them are distinct and different. Regionalism is
about autonomy and identity at a regional level, and about ‘scaling up’ to better engage
with particular environmental and social issues, driven from below. Regionalisation is
about central governments achieving efficiencies and effectiveness by concentrating
program delivery at the regional scale, usually while retaining financial control and
hence program direction. It is not uncommon for the two forces to be at cross purposes,
with regional community leaders having very different aspirations for particular
programs from those held by policy makers in Canberra or State capitals (Campbell,
1996).
This is a very important observation as the tensions between regionalism and regionalisation
are clearly apparent. The importance of developing institutional structures that balance the
need for scientific assessment, leadership and centralised planning from the “top down” with
strategies for engaging landholders and local communities from the “bottom up” is clearly
critical. 4
Figure 2 puts forward a conceptual model that illustrates the hierarchy of institutions that have
an interest in natural resource management and the roles they may play at different scales.
The figure highlights a number of issues and principles for institutional design.
•  Management needs to be linked across scales with each tier of management
having unique responsibilities within a nested hierarchy.
•  Regional coordination and planning has the potential to bridge the gap between
“top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches.
•  A diversity of partnerships with both government and non-government players is
required to develop successful programmes for developing partnerships with local
communities and landholders (we return to this issue in Section 2.2).
4 It is noted that terms “top-down” and “bottom-up” are somewhat value laden. Niether should be
considered superior. Rather the point being made is that the best elements of both are required to
successfully manage biodiversity across scales.Institutions for managing biodiversity
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Figure 2: Institutional approaches to natural resource management
It is tempting to use a model of this kind to simply prescribe a universal solution to
biodiversity management. This implies that:
•  New Zealand’s central government would take the lead in developing legislative
frameworks and ensuring adequate resources are available at a regional scale.
•  Regional and district councils would take the lead in developing regional
strategies and brokering partnerships for on-ground delivery with local
government and the private sector.
•  Local government, non-government organisations and private individuals would
be actively encouraged to develop and deliver on-ground management
programmes.
However, it is important to recognise that capacities, willingness and responsibilities of
organisations to manage biodiversity vary across regions. A particularly important issue is
who should take the lead in developing and integrating biodiversity policy at the regional
scale. The section which follows shows that there is a range of different ways of achieving
this leadership.
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2.1.3 Addressing different capacities for biodiversity management
A framework for evaluating the role of different tiers of government in developing successful
regional partnerships for biodiversity conservation is set out in figure 3. The framework was
developed following analysis of the following factors (Binning, Young and Cripps, 1999):
•  the processes that threaten biodiversity in different regions and how these relate
to the core functions and responsibilities of different tiers of government;
•  the capacity of local institutions, as determined by population size and the rate
base; and
•  the coincidence between local, regional and national priorities for the
conservation of biodiversity.
Variation in the overall ability of local institutions to take the lead in developing responses to
biodiversity can be readily identified using this framework.
For example, in addressing the first of these factors a distinction can be drawn between
responsibilities of regional and district councils. Regional Councils would have more
responsibility in rural regions where the main pressures arise from agricultural activity that
threatens the natural resources for which they have responsibility: air, water, soil, the coast,
pollution and discharges. One the other hand, district councils may have relatively more
responsibility in urban and peri-urban regions where development and subdivision are the
main pressure on biodiversity.
Figure 3: Framework for developing partnerships
In the figure, it is clearly desirable to facilitate transition of local institutions to the top right
corner over time. This could be described as the central challenge for the New Zealand
Government in developing policies and programmes that build consensus and the capacity of
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Outlined below is a brief description of the key strategies for developing successful
approaches in each of the categories identified in the figure.
Low capacity regions with coinciding interests
Regions with a low capacity to manage biodiversity tend to be rural regions where
there is neither a large population base nor development pressures. These regions are
unlikely to be actively involved in vegetation management because they lack the
resources required to take action outside their key areas of responsibility. However,
many of these regions have strong support for improved vegetation management,
primarily motivated towards the management of land degradation processes.
Regions of this kind are relatively common in the agricultural heartlands of Australia
where natural resource management problems such as dryland salinity are common.
From our reading it is quite likely regional councils in New Zealand have greater
capacity to address natural resource management issues, given their responsibilities
under the Resource Management Act 1991. However, an interesting question is how
much capacity these councils have to address indigenous biodiversity issues. Our
understanding is that capacity and commitment to biodiversity conservation is quite
varied across New Zealand.
Key challenge: Capacity building with resources, knowledge and policy instruments.
In these regions, the most effective strategy will be for central government to
engage directly in partnership with regional councils and non-government
organisations to plan effectively for biodiversity. Central government will need
to play the lead role in coordinating approaches and providing data and
expertise. With this support, these regions will generally have greater capacity to
undertake effective regional planning and programme delivery.
High capacity regions with coinciding interests
Regions with a high capacity to manage biodiversity tend to be located in population
centres in the coastal zone. Conflicts between local and national interests tend to be
minimised because there is a strong diversity of interests within the community,
which are then reflected in the composition of councils, who in turn have
responsibility for the management of urban development, the key threat to the
management of natural resources, including biodiversity.
A key issue in New Zealand for regions fitting into this category is to clarify roles and
responsibilities between district and regional councils and to ensure that these
councils have the capacity to implement the full range of policy instruments and tools
described in section 3.
Key issue: Institutional reform to ensure regions have access to the full range of
policy tools.
In these regions the preferred strategy would be to give regional and district
councils autonomy to coordinate the development of accredited regional natural
resource management plans that include biodiversity as a core element.
High capacity regions with conflicting interests
Regional and district councils in regions with conflicting national and local interests
may not be in a position to reconcile differences that occur, for example, when high
profile developments are proposed on sites of high conservation value.Institutions for managing biodiversity
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The clearing of glider habitat within the coastal zone of Queensland for sugar cane
development is an Australian example of a case where there are conflicting local and
national interests. In New Zealand, a central issue is to clarify how central
government should be involved in these situations.
Key issue: Capacity building, conflict resolution and ensuring minimum legislative
standards are maintained.
In these regions, stronger involvement of central government will be required to
reconcile differences in objectives for the management of biodiversity. Conflict
resolution tools will be required. However, attempts should be made to maintain
active council and community involvement in any processes developed.
Low capacity regions with conflicting interests
Regions fitting this category will tend to be rural and remote regions facing declining
returns from grazing-based industries, leading to falling populations and loss of key
rural services and infrastructure. Councils in these regions are unlikely to perceive or
want responsibility for biodiversity issues. They are likely to have a strong focus on
issues of rural decline and landholder rights. In Australia, councils in regions of this
kind are quite antagonistic to the notion of being asked to make a contribution to the
conservation of biodiversity.
Key issue: Capacity building and structural adjustment.
In these regions, approaches that build local capacity and manage structural
adjustment are required from the central government. Regional strategies,
developed through structures that are directly supported and managed by
central government, are likely to be most successful.Institutions for managing biodiversity
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2.2 ROLE OF THE NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANISATIONS IN
FOSTERING PARTNERSHIPS
Up until this point we have largely ignored the role of non-government organisations, i.e. the
private sector and landholders, other than to note that these organisations will play a role in
the delivery of conservation programmes at a local scale.
In addition to this driver, there are also a number of characteristics of the non-government
sector that highlight the importance of its more active engagement in developing new
approaches to biodiversity conservation.
•  The perceived independence of the non-government sector means that it can engage
many private landholders who will not deal with government. The experience of
Trust for Nature in Victoria Australia, which was modelled directly from QEII
National Trust systems, would suggest this is indeed the case.
•  Non-government organisations are often less constrained than government agencies,
and hence are better able to gauge community needs and to develop entrepreneurial
solutions. Global experience suggests they are often the source of innovation.
•  Free of bureaucratic processes, non-government organisations are often able to
deliver on-ground outcomes more efficiently than government organisations. This is
particularly true at local and regional scales where individual knowledge and
networks are often critical.
These points are important when considering the role of partnerships with private landholders
in securing conservation outcomes. The initial reaction of many people to strategies for
engaging landholders in biodiversity conservation is that they represent the thin edge of the
wedge – a form of disguised regulation through which government is seeking to impose land-
use restrictions on landholders. However, if these strategies are to succeed they must seek to
achieve and retain strong landholder support and commitment (Farrier, 1995, Binning and
Young, 1997a).
Ultimately landholders must be active stewards of the biodiversity that occurs on their
properties. The non-government sector, acting at arms length to government, has the potential
to be more effective than government in delivering this outcome (Binning and Feilman,
2000).
A final rationale for involving the private sector is one of mutual obligation within a civil
society. The private sector derives benefits from biodiversity and, hence, has a responsibility
to contribute towards its sustainable management.
The following issues set an agenda for achieving more effective engagement of the non-
government sector:
•  Developing successful partnerships with the non-government sector
•  Giving recognition to non-government activities for biodiversity conservation
•  Removing impediments to the non-government sector using a suite of policy
instruments designed to fully engage landholders and local communities.Institutions for managing biodiversity
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2.2.1 Developing partnerships with the non-government sector
Figure 4 provides an overview of the current range of non-government activity in nature
conservation in Australia. A brief analysis of the New Zealand situation is contained in
Section 5 of this report although a comprehensive beyond the scope of this study.
In recent years there has been considerable growth in the range of non-government activity.
This is perhaps best evidenced by the growth in the number of non-government organisations
actively promoting the protection of arras of indigenous biodiversity. Organisations such as
the Trust for Nature (Vic), the Australian Landscape Trust, The Australian Bush Heritage
Fund, National Trust (WA) and the World Wide Fund for Nature have all significantly
expanded their role. Further, the New South Wales, Queensland and South Australian
governments are actively considering supporting the establishment of independent
Conservation Trusts, modeled on the Victorian Trust for Nature. At a local scale there is a
huge range of local and regionally based groups undertaking conservation works both within
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Figure 4: The range of non-government players in Australia
Closer to government, but at arms length from it, organisations such as Greening Australia are
actively involved in delivering government programmes. Strong linkages between the
community and government also exist through advisory bodies and advocacy groups.
Whilst the level and growth of activity is encouraging, the challenge is to identify the
mechanisms through which more effective partnerships can be developed between the
different categories of organisation represented in figure 4. Too often current conservation
initiatives are constrained by only involving a narrow range of organisations. For example,
and although there are notable exceptions, local Landcare and catchment groups are often tied
to government funding programmes and have only limited awareness or connection to
business, philanthropic or research organisations with an interest in nature conservation andInstitutions for managing biodiversity
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natural resource management. If synergies between organisations can be found, particularly
ones that provide connectivity between urban and regional centres, it is believed that markets,
funding and participation of the non-government sector in conservation activities can be
significantly expanded.
The following characteristics of successful partnerships for nature conservation have been
identified through the Australian research (Binning and Feilman, 2000):
•  the collaboration of several non-government organisations, businesses and
government working in partnership to achieve conservation outcomes at a
landscape/regional scale;
•  an appropriate balance struck between engagement of local communities and their
aspirations for land management and leadership in natural resource management
through provision of information, identification of conservation priorities, funding
and organisational support;
•  acceptance that different organisations have different strengths and weaknesses and
hence different niches within which they can effectively contribute in partnership;
•  active promotion of successes and collaboration to secure ongoing community and
political support, including funding from both the public and private sector.
If the non-government sector is to actively work with governments there is a need to establish
relationships where power and decision-making are evenly shared. Given the differences in
the decision-making processes of governments and private organisations and businesses, this
is a far from superficial issue.
Mechanisms do exist within Australia for establishing community, business and government
partnerships, but they a bureaucratic and administratively cumbersome. The challenge is to
engage the corporate and philanthropic sectors to scale up their investment by contributing to
larger scale regional programmes. A recent workshop of community, business and
government leaders in Australia identified the opportunity to facilitate larger scale
partnerships for landscape conservation using a charter for government-business-community
partnerships (Binning and Feilman, 2000).
The purpose of the charter would be to articulate the principles against which large-scale
conservation partnerships may be put in place in an administratively efficient manner. The
charter would include:
•  a vision for the role and growth of non-government investment in landscape
conservation;
•  strategies for capacity building covering provision of expertise and networks for
information sharing, and programmes for organisational learning;
•  arrangements for joint funding of large investments in conservation at a regional
scale;
•  the development of markets for environmental services that allow urban populations
to donate or purchase shares in landscape reconstruction (this includes shares with a
monetary value, such as carbon credits or agroforestry).
Other key issues for enhancing the role of the non-government sector are expanded on in the
remainder of this section.Institutions for managing biodiversity
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2.2.2 Giving recognition to non-government activities
A key issue for coordinating implementation of New Zealand’s Biodiversity Strategy will be
the capacity to monitor, account and quantify the contribution of government and non-
government activities outside of the formal reserve system, and in particular, on private land.
Mechanisms for accounting for and quantifying the contribution of the non-government sector
to achieving conservation objectives are yet to develop in Australia. In New Zealand the QEII
National Trust receives much of it’s funding from the Crown and is required to report to
parliament. However, we are uncertain of the extent to which conservation planning between
land-use tenures is being effectively integrated.
Lack of institutional recognition for private conservation means that the contribution of
private initiatives cannot be readily quantified. This is important for two reasons. First, it
means that the role of private conservation is often neglected in the development of
government policy at national, state, regional and local scales. Second, the poor public profile
of private conservation impedes its future growth.
The concept of a Conservation Management Network has been developed to address this
concern; see figure 5 (Prober and Thiele, 1996, 1999; Binning and Young 1997a). The
objective is to develop management strategies that maximise the contribution that each tenure
of land can make to the achievement of conservation outcomes. No tenure is considered
“superior” to another. Rather, management strategies that maximise opportunities for
integrating conservation objectives with other land-uses are actively pursued on all land
tenures. For example, in the case of rural lands, conservation actions would need to be
integrated with agricultural practices and the protection of corridors of native vegetation. The










Figure 5: The concept of a conservation management network
It is noted that such a framework is not new and is consistent with the approach used in the
United Nations Environment Programme’s Biosphere Reserve model, which was initiated in
1972. It also has similarities to the definition of protected area network in the New Zealand
Biodiversity Strategy. However, although this concept is not new, there remain significant
impediments to its application. Perhaps the most significant of these is the pervasive culture
that nature conservation is a public responsibility with little or no role for private individuals.
This culture is changing, both in Australia and New Zealand, as evidenced by the
development of biodiversity strategies and associated policies to engage private landholders.
However, application of the concept requires that currently fragmented approaches to
conservation policy be more effectively coordinated across all government agencies (Binning,
1997).
In addition to engaging private landholders, another challenge is to engage public authorities
that manage land but do not have conservation as a primary management objective. ForInstitutions for managing biodiversity
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example, in Australia many of the most valuable remnants of temperate woodlands and
grasslands are found on vacant crown land, rail easements, travelling stock routes and
cemeteries (Prober and Theile, 1996).
Coordination management across tenures could be facilitated by the development of a
database that contains:
•  the distribution of native vegetation by ecological communities within the region;
•  the significance of specific sites in meeting the region’s conservation objectives
including, where available, an assessment of site quality; and
•  the security of management for conservation on the site. For example the land-uses
permitted and any commitments entered by the landholder to conservation
management.
If such a database were maintained it would be possible to objectively evaluate the status of
ecological communities and review management strategies. The database would also provide
a baseline against which changes and losses in the distribution of ecological communities
could be measured through time.
The database could also record more detailed information on when land managers have been
approached, and if they have accessed information or incentive programmes from a
government agency or local government. This last point is important because, although there
are already a wide range of programmes available to promote conservation outcomes,
awareness of these programmes is likely to be low and coordination of their activities is likely
to have been poor.
No State or region in Australia currently maintains a database of this kind, a fact that is a
significant impediment to the coordination and targeting of conservation programmes
nationally (Dore, Binning and Hayes, 1999).
A Community Conservation Network, or set of regionally based networks with supporting
database, is the foundation upon which biodiversity conservation can be coordinated on and
off-reserve (Binning and Thorman, 1999).
The simple existence of this information would enable implementation options for regional
strategies to begin to be prioritised. For example:
•  public land whose management is currently inappropriate can be identified and the
responsible management agency or local government approached;
•  private lands of highest significance can be targeted for incentives for voluntary
conservation management and covenants; and
•  land of highest conservation significance that is at immediate risk of development
may be targeted for acquisition or re-zoning.
Such a network would enable greater emphasis to be placed on encouraging community and
private investment in conservation on private lands outside the formal public reserve system
in meeting the objectives of the Biodiversity Strategy.
A database of this kind would be best held and managed by government agencies. However, it
would be critical that access be provided to all relevant government and non-government
organisations, whilst taking account of privacy issues.Institutions for managing biodiversity
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2.2.3 Removing impediments to partnerships between the non-
government sector and landholders
Designing effective policies and programmes for engaging private landholders in biodiversity
conservation raises a number of significant issues. They:
•  require a high level of information on the conservation value and status of individual
sites;
•  require close cooperation and trust between the landholders and the partnership
organisation, who may be suspicious of government involvement;
•  are seeking to secure objectives of a very long term nature, and hence the
programmes themselves require long term support which is often lacking within
government; and
•  are resource intensive in terms of the facilitation effort and personal contact required.
The government agencies that currently manage off-reserve conservation generally do not
have the culture or the capacity to adequately address all of these challenges. Non-
government organisations could potentially play many of these roles. The broadening of
Australian non-government organisations to include on-ground organisations as well as
traditional advocacy groups, is encouraging.
However, because conservation policy and legislative structures have not been developed
with active involvement of the private sector in mind, many significant impediments to
accessing the full range of conservation tools may exist. Key examples of the type of
impediment that exist in Australia that may also exist in New Zealand are5:
•  Capacity to establish independent conservation trusts and organisations:
Arrangements are required which allow for the efficient establishment of
organisations committed to developing programmes and funding on-ground
conservation works at national, State, regional and local scales. These organisations
should enjoy equivalent tax treatment to other charitable organisations.
•  Access to covenanting powers: all regions should have in place arrangements for
conservation trusts to enter conservation covenants that have a statutory basis, are
registered or noted on land title, and are binding in perpetuity.
•  Taxation treatment of private reserves: secure private conservation reserves
(covered by a covenant) should enjoy the similar treatment to primary producers who
can, for example access tax deductions for management costs (these issues are
addressed in detail in section 4).
•  Institutions for the creation of environmental markets: non-government
organisations are limited in their capacity to promote and secure land use change
through markets for environmental services such as markets for carbon sequestration
or markets for the conservation streamside buffers that limit rapid run-off and hence
maintain water quality. One example is that markets for environmental services
require a mechanism that allows separation of ownership of environmental services
from land, as is the case in forestry where ownership of trees/timber and land can be
separated. Further separations could be permitted to allow for the establishment of
separate markets for environmental services such as carbon, biodiversity and water
purification. It is noted that a conservation covenant, tied to a one-off payment
equivalent to the value of the environmental service provided, may be one mechanism
5 The QE II National Trust notes that New Zealand already has the capacity for charitable trusts to be
established and that the Trust provides a covenanting power throughout New Zealand.Institutions for managing biodiversity
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for achieving this outcome. New South Wales is the first Australian State to pass
legislation that allows for the separation of carbon rights from land.
These are examples of potential institutional and policy impediments to the non-government
sector, which should be able to promote biodiversity conservation on a “level playing field”
with the government sector. Principles of competitive neutrality highlight the potential of a
thorough review directed at enhancing these capacities, for instance by giving non-
government organisations equal access to conservation funding by government through the
creation of contestable funds.
A potential model for securing non-government involvement sector involvement is outlined in
figure 6.
Figure 6 – Empowering the non-government sector to deliver on-ground programmes
In the figure an overarching Conservation Trust provides support and builds the capacity of
regions to undertake conservation works. It can accredit local and regional trusts to deliver
conservation programmes. The model developed in Section 2.1 that analyses the role and
responsibility of government in devolving responsibility to a regional scale has parallels with
model proposed above. The key difference is that the delivery of conservation programmes in
this model is facilitated by non-government organisations at arms length from government.
The role of such a Trust would be to facilitate voluntary conservation by landholders. It
would have no role in regulating landholders. However, there is the potential for such trusts to
work in partnership with governments, particularly at local and regional scales.
In New Zealand it is possible that the QE II National Trust could play this role. The
distinction is that the trust would shift its primary role from working with landholders to
working to build the capacity of other organisations to deliver voluntary conservation
programmes on-ground. Of course care needs to taken to ensure that an overarching Trust of
this kind does not create centralised and inflexible approaches, or add another tier of
accountability. Rather its primary functions would be related to identifying conservation
priorities on private land, providing expertise to local and community based groups, providing
checks and balances on the covenanting process and potentially acting as a source of funding.
Similar objectives could be achieved through existing trusts moving to actively establish
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engaging private landholders. In order to appeal to the broadest range of landholders, partner
organisations may include industry, farming, conservation and, philanthropic organisations.
The model of enabling/model legislation for the establishment of Conservation and Land
Trusts has been drawn from the United States where in excess of 1500 Land Trusts have been
established. In this case, an umbrella organisation – the Land Trust Alliance – supports the
work of individual Trusts, coordinates activities and provides supporting knowledge and
training programmes that build organisation capacity (Binning and Young, 1999c).
The experience of the U.S. Nature Conservancy is described in Case Study 6.Institutions for managing biodiversity
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2.3 SUMMARY OF PRINCIPLES FOR INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
To conclude the discussion of institutional frameworks CSIRO developed six key principles
for successful biodiversity planning and programme delivery at a regional scale (Binning,
Young and Cripps, 1999).
Principle 1: Clear definition of roles and responsibilities – the development of
regional strategies requires clear distinction to be maintained between the following
roles and responsibilities:
−  decision-making associated with the performance of statutory functions
including land-use approvals;
−  the provision of expertise, advice and stakeholder input to the
development of programmes, policies and regulations developed under the
statutory process; and
−  the delivery of natural resource management programmes through a diverse
range of structures, including partnerships with the non-government sector.
Principle 2: Maintenance of outcome-based legislative framework – a legislative
framework that takes account of biodiversity and facilitates regional planning should
be in place. This framework should establish clear minimum standards for the
maintenance of biodiversity, e.g. through requirements to conserve a comprehensive
and adequate range of different ecological communities.
Principle 3: Delegation and development of action based regional strategies –
regional strategies that meet minimum standards should be accredited and
management responsibility devolved. Core elements of a regional strategy are
described on the following page (Box 1).
Principle 4: Flexible delivery – regional plans should involve diverse partnerships
with both government and non-government organisations for delivery polices and
programmes across all land tenures. Implementation programmes should include the
full suite of policy tools ranging through education and motivational tools, regulations
and property right-based instruments, and financial incentives (see discussion of
model toolkit in the next section).
Principle 5: Adequate resources – funding, information and expertise to meet
required minimum standards should be secured for the region.
Principle 6: Monitoring and review - performance indicators and accountability
measures should be in place and include provision for regular review of outcomes and
the appropriateness of existing standards.
In addition to these principles biodiversity conservation will need to be integrated with other
natural resource management strategies, including land-use planning, water quality and pest
control strategies. Indeed the management of biodiversity is often integral to the achievement
of these objectives.Institutions for managing biodiversity
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Box 1 – Key elements of a regional biodiversity strategy
Establishment of a coordinating body: A local or regionally based body is given
responsibility for overall coordination and strategic development of the regional strategy. This
body will require a balance of expertise and skills. It is important to note that the coordinating
body need not be a part of government or perform statutory functions, it may, for example, be
an advisory board of relevant experts and stakeholders. Its role is to bring the various interests
together at an appropriate scale for natural resource management planning. It should have
defined relationships to other regional agencies.
Memorandum of Understanding on statutory processes: A formal Memorandum of
Understanding will be required between the agencies with statutory responsibilities and other
parties with a role in delivering the regional action plan. The purpose of the memorandum of
understanding is to outline how each agency or organisation with statutory responsibilities will
interpret and apply the legislation under their control within the region. A key objective is to
streamline existing approval processes and the delivery of on-ground programmes.
Integrated land use plans: All statutory land use planning should be integrated into a single
coordinated land use planning framework that forms the basis of regional natural resource,
economic and social planning. For the purposes of biodiversity planning, mapping of the
distribution of indigenous biodiversity within the region, on the basis of agreed ecological
communities across all land tenures, is a critical step. Key threats to biodiversity and
appropriate management responses will also need to be identified. Any tensions in the land
use planning responsibilities of statutory agencies will be resolved through the Memorandum
of Understanding.
Implementation programme:A ni m p l e m e n t a t i o np r o g r a m m ed r a w i n go nt h ef u l lr a n g eo f
policy tools will be developed that is consistent with priorities identified in the planning
phase.
Funding and resourcing partnership agreement: All tiers of government will agree
resources for the strategy with a minimum five year commitment to the implementation
programme.
Accountability criteria: As regions are given greater flexibility in achieving defined
outcomes, these must be measured and accountability procedures put in place.Policy Toolkit
Conserving Biodiversity -– Institutions, Policies and Incentives
CSIRO Sustainable Ecosystems
33
3. MODEL TOOLKIT 
The New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy and the Bio-What report have comprehensively
addressed the range of strategic issues that need to be addressed in improving the
management of biodiversity. A key gap remains, however, in documenting the range of tools
that are available for implementation – that is to engage landholders and the broader
community in the conservation of biodiversity.
Figure 7 provides and overview of the range of instruments that can be used to implement
policies for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity.
Figure 7: The policy mix
The toolbox is divided into the following broad categories (Binning and Young, 1997).
•  People - the tools that can be used to motivate and retain landholders’ support for
vegetation programmes;
•  Security - the regulatory, legal and voluntary property right instruments that can
be used to provide secure adaptive management of vegetation; and
•  Finance - the incentives that can be provided to share the costs of managing
vegetation.
These categories provide a powerful framework for the development of implementation
programmes for biodiversity strategies. The concept of sustainable development highlights
the that policy approaches to natural resource management will be more effective if strong
linkages are drawn between social, economic and environmental drivers. This process is
mirrored in policy design where there is considerable evidence that policies that harness the
synergies between: educational (people), regulatory (security) and economic incentives
(finance). These are likely to be more effective both in terms of cost and environmental
outcome (Farrier, 1995; Young et.al, 1996; OECD, 1996, Binning and Young, 1997a).
This insight is critical because policy makers are generally biased to one type of instrument
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planners tend to prefer regulation and land-use planning, economists incentive instruments,
and social scientists education and participatory processes. A critical management issue in
developing successful implementation strategies is to bring these differing perspectives
together and to seek out complementarity.
A key challenge for governments is to facilitate understanding of the range of tools available,
remove impediments to their use, and actively promote their adoption through the
development of model policy instruments and the provision of catalytic funding to local and
regional organisations to support the implementation of new policies (Cripps et.al, 1999).
In the remainder of this section the range of tools available within each of these categories is
discussed to provide background for a number of case study examples that are used to derive
a range of key principles for policy design and instrument selection.Policy Toolkit
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3.1 PEOPLE –E DUCATION AND MOTIVATIONAL TOOLS
Education and motivational tools are required to develop understanding and the willingness of
local communities and landholders to adopt new management practices for the conservation
of biodiversity.
These tools are designed to raise awareness and shift the willingness of the community to take
action to conserve native vegetation.
3.1.1 Landholder Facilitation
A critical relationship is that between the landholder and the government or non-government
organisation seeking to promote the conservation of biodiversity.
A particular priority is to develop an ethic of environmental stewardship by landholders
(Farrier, 1995). Stewardship has two critical attributes: first a willingness and commitment of
the landholder to sustainable management; and second, a strong relationship with third parties
who provide advice and incentives for improved land management.
The first of these attributes is relatively common and the second relatively rare. Successful
approaches to landholder facilitation are set out below.
Community facilitation
In Australia community based facilitation for sustainable land management was pioneered by
the Landcare movement (Campbell, 1995). This movement has been credited with raising the
awareness of landholders of sustainability issues.
Few dare to argue against the efficacy of the Landcare movement. It undoubtedly has
strengths in its grass routes nature and its commitment to learning through community
participation in group-based activities. The movement has a commendable history.
Criticisms and shortcomings can, however, be identified. Landcare does not connect with
many landholders who are individualistic and wary of group interactions. With increased
funding from the Natural Heritage Trust in Australia it has been argued that Landcare groups
have stopped discussing issues and simply become a mechanism for bidding for and
managing funds. Landcare was initially focussed on sustainable production with little
attention paid to conservation and biodiversity issues, and it has proved difficult for
approaches to biodiversity to penetrate this culture. Finally, community based conservation is
often criticised as lacking strategic direction and suffering from the difficulties of spreading
scare resources over many groups rather than focussing on key priorities.
All of these criticisms are valid but still do not detract from the power and influence of the
movement and its role in group learning. Landcare is the foundation stone of community
facilitation in Australia. However, in itself it is not sufficient.
Individual facilitation
Evidence suggests that little if anything can replace the need for face-to-face contact with
trained facilitation officers on site.
A review of programmes in Australia reveals that individual facilitation is the most effective
educative tool in delivering both attitudinal and behavioural change in landholders,
particularly when combined with catalytic or cost sharing incentives (Williams, 2000). This is
because a true dialogue is generated and concepts can be readily transferred into plans for
action that can be implemented.Policy Toolkit
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A number of successful programmes have operated on this basis in Australia. In relation to
biodiversity, Land for Wildlife is the most notable example (see box 2). Other programmes
which have successfully used individual facilitation services include fencing grants by
Greening Australia (see case study 3) and the use of locally-employed facilitation officers in
the Taking Action Now programme protecting the highly fragmented Grassy White Box
Woodlands of the western slopes of NSW.
Key lessons from these programmes suggest (Lambert and Elix, 1998):
•  One-on-one communication is an essential element of successful landholder
facilitation;
•  Facilitation officers employed from the local community (preferably local
landholders) are likely to be better accepted and hence more effective; and
•  Non-government delivery of facilitation services is often more acceptable, better
targeted and more cost effective.
Box 2 – Land for Wildlife
Land for Wildlife is a facilitation programme that was initiated by the Victorian Department of
Conservation and Natural Resources and the Bird Observers Club of Australia. The objective
of the programme is to encourage and assist landholders to conserve native flora and fauna on
their property, even though the property may be managed primarily for other purposes.
The programme is analogous to the Landcare programme, which provides advice on
sustainable agriculture to rural landholders, with two important differences. Firstly, it is
focused on achieving nature conservation objectives. Secondly, it is focused on providing one-
to-one advice to land managers rather than providing information through group-based
facilitation and demonstration.
The programme is entirely voluntary and does not bind landholders in any way. It represents
the first step in engaging landholders and securing their interest in nature conservation. It is
critical that a programme of this kind be completely divorced from any regulatory or land-use
planning functions of the local councils in the region.
The programme essentially supports a network of landholders who have an interest in
conservation on their properties. It has the three following elements.
•  Provision of Management Advice: Land for Wildlife facilitation officers provide free
advice on the protection and management of native vegetation to any landholder who
seeks assistance from the programme. This process involves a site visit to assess native
vegetation found on the property, and its condition. Strategies for ongoing management,
rehabilitation and (where appropriate) revegetation may be established.
•  Support Network: Participating landholders are kept engaged in the programme through a
range of ongoing support mechanisms. Information is distributed via a low cost quarterly
newsletter Land for Wildlife News. Field days and local projects are also sponsored by the
programme.
•  Property Registration: Landholders may choose to register their property as part of Land
for Wildlife. In this case property and habitat details are recorded on a centralised
database. Registration is entirely voluntary and non-binding. The landholder can withdraw
from the programme at any time. Registration is acknowledged by provision of a
certificate and sign, both of which serve to advertise that the property supports the
programme, and provides community acknowledgment to the landholder.
The programme provides the foundation for successful voluntary conservation on private lands.
The facilitation and motivational support provides a base from which landholders may enter
more binding agreements for the conservation of native vegetation on their properties. The
focus on voluntary private lands conservation has made Land for Wildlife one of Australia’s
most successful conservation programmes.Policy Toolkit
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However, individual facilitation is resource intensive. A major challenge is to build the
capacity of existing facilitation networks to advise on the management of indigenous
biodiversity (Williams, 2000; Dore, Binning and Hayes 1999). Another is to retain
government funding for facilitation, which often has intangible results. As discussed in the
case study on fencing assistance by Greening Australia, this problem can be addressed when
facilitation is tied to catalytic incentives (see below).
3.1.2 Education
Education is critical to securing support for biodiversity conservation. Awareness of the
significance and importance of biodiversity in the general community cannot be over-
emphasised, as it is from these quarters that political will, funding and other resources are
ultimately derived.
Decision-makers and community leaders
A key target for education programmes is key decision-makers in both the government and
non-government sectors. Within central government decision-makers are critical to achieving
institutional recognition and change. The development of the New Zealand Biodiversity
Strategy is evidence that this process is well in train.
At a local level leadership is equally critical in developing on ground action. In our analysis
of the role of local government in biodiversity conservation (Binning, Young and Cripps,
1999), we identified the critical role of champions at the local scale in developing successful
programmes. They are characterised by:
•  having a clear strategic vision;
•  being able to build consensus between competing organisations;
•  embracing new ideas; and
•  having continuity and long term involvement in the development of programmes
(often in excess of 10 years).
How is such leadership generated? A clear priority is to raise awareness of managers, chief
executives and elected representatives. A biodiversity information kit was prepared for
Australian decision-makers and has enjoyed limited success. A more effective strategy may
be to sponsor key leaders in biodiversity conservation to give targeted presentations to
audiences of decision-makers.
Landholders
Facilitation as a core education strategy for landholders is addressed separately (above).
Other education strategies involve including biodiversity in property planning courses and
providing relevant technical information to landholders through various media. Some success
has been experienced in Australia through developing conservation and natural resource
management modules in property management courses. A good example is the Farming for
the Future programme in New South Wales.
A recent review of materials including planning kits, technical notes and how-to pamphlets
revealed a vast amount of literature in Australia aimed at providing relevant information to
landholders. However, four main weaknesses in this material were cited (Morton, 1999):
a) much of the information is shallow, offering advice of only a generalised
fashion;Policy Toolkit
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b) information in the area of the financial cost of changing management is rarely
offered;
c) information available to urban landholders is very limited; and
d) the backup/facilitation support required to complement printed material is
rarely forthcoming.
Thus care needs to be taken to clearly target information to landholders and closely align this
information with facilitation networks.
Schools
A key longer term strategy is to raise the awareness of biodiversity issues within the broader
community. An important element of this approach is the development of programmes within
schools to educate children on the role and function of biodiversity. In Australia there are
numerous programmes aimed at involving schools in environmental education. There is,
however, no well-established curriculum for environmental management, including
biodiversity conservation.
An important opportunity would be for the region to work with the Education Department to
develop a formal curriculum on environmental issues. This could be supported by bushland
projects and may even include a “Biodiversity and Schools” programme with schools
competing for annual “Landcare” and/or “Biodiversity” conservation awards.
Community and voluntary involvement
One view is that communication and learning about biodiversity values is most effectively
achieved through direct involvement with the management of biodiversity and natural areas.
Examples of programmes that engage voluntary assistance from members of the community
are outlined below:
•  A range of monitoring programmes that involve community and school groups
have been developed in Australia, the most notable of which is Water Watch
which involves hundreds of groups across the country monitoring water quality at
regular intervals.
•  A number of local councils involve community groups in voluntary management
of bushland areas. Activities can range from simple working bees to establishing
community committees to oversee the management key council reserves.
Ku-Ring-Gai Municipal Council and Brisbane City Council are leading examples
in this area.
•  Volunteer and compulsory “work for the dole” programmes involve young
people and the unemployed in environmental management. It is hoped that self
reliance and a work ethic can be developed through the programmes. The
Australian Trust for Conservation Volunteers is a central player in this field in
Australia.
Community involvement is a highly effective education strategy. It does, however, require
dedicated resources. In interviews with local government, resistance to involving the
community was often expressed in terms of inefficiency, legal liability and misaligned
objectives with council (Binning, Smyth and Catling, 2000). These are all valid concerns, but
must be weighed against the benefits of developing strong community networks at the local
scale.Policy Toolkit
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3.2 FINANCE –I NCENTIVES FOR MANAGING BIODIVERSITY
Financial incentives play a critical role in securing voluntary uptake of conservation
programmes. They can also assist landholders in meeting the costs of transition to a new
regulatory standard.
There is much debate over when and how much landholders should be paid to take action to
conserve biodiversity or address natural resource management issues. A distinction can be
drawn between:
•  The Duty of Care for sustainable land management faced by a landholder; and
•  The provision of non-marketable “Public Conservation Service” by landholders
managing vegetation to meet conservation objectives.
Determining where “duty of care” stops and “public conservation service” begins is a difficult
issue. It is suggested that the dividing line should be drawn between those management
practices required to achieve land-use objectives at a landscape or regional scale and any
additional practices required to sustain sites of unique conservation value6. Hence, a public
conservation service is provided when the community’s interest lies in securing active and
ongoing management of a particular site (Binning and Young, 1997a).
The design of effective financial incentives depends on their relationship to regulatory and
motivation programmes. Different models of financial incentives are outlined below although
many others exist. As will be demonstrated, different cost burdens can be justified in different
circumstances. Rather than confining payments to one level it will be more effective to define
the rules and situations under which different levels of incentive can be justified.
3.2.1 Grants
Community grants
These are grants provided to community/landcare groups to undertake conservation works.
They are the foundation of the $1.3 billion Natural Heritage Trust in Australia. Whilst
undoubtedly successful, care needs to be taken to ensure proposed works are targeted at
priority natural resource management actions.
Criticism has been made that existing grant-based programmes are being poorly targeted and
are of insufficient a scale to make an impression on land degradation issues (Dore, Binning
and Hayes, 1999). A key issue is determining how to strategically invest larger amounts in
high priority areas, hence leaving other regions with less funds. This of course raises equity
issues. The issue is whether regional equity or maximum biodiversity outcome is the priority.
Catalytic incentives and grants
Catalytic incentives are used to reinforce existing motivations of landholders and to secure
behavioural change. Catalytic incentives are characterised by being small payments that meet
a proportion of the costs of on-ground works. They typically require a substantial landholder
contribution, at least 50% in the case of the Natural Heritage Trust. They are highly effective
in regions where landholder awareness and participation in conservation programmes is high.
6 An example may be that clearing of areas of indigenous biodiversity would not generally be
permitted without offsetting measures. However, sites that justify intensive pest and weed management
strategies could qualify for ongoing assistance. This is similar to the approach taken in the Bio-What
report (Ministerial Council, 2000).Policy Toolkit
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An excellent example of a catalytic incentive is the Greening Australia Fencing Assistance
Program described in third case study in the final section of this paper.
Cost sharing grants
Cost sharing incentives provide funding for on-ground works on the basis of a calculation the
relative proportion of public and private benefits associated with that work (MDBC, 1996).
These payments are typically larger than catalytic incentives, but have the advantage that
payment can be more effectively targeted at strategic priorities. A good example of this
approach is the Coorong Salinity Action plan that provides funding for on-ground works on
the basis of the contribution made to meeting strategic objects for both salinity control and
biodiversity conservation. Payments vary from $40 ha for establishment of lucerne pasture to
control ground water levels to $1500 ha plus fencing costs for natural habitat of high
conservation value (Coorong District Committee, 1997).
3.2.2 Stewardship payments
Stewardship payments can be defined as ongoing annual payments for conservation
management of natural areas. They are typically paid at a rate near the full opportunity cost of
conservation management. Payments of this kind are typically restricted to areas of
outstanding conservation value that are protected by a binding conservation covenant. They
can be argued to represent a cost effective alternative to public acquisition and management,
particularly for ecological communities that are highly fragmented. Experience with the use
of stewardship payments is limited in Australia to the $30 million private forest reserves
programme that resulted from the Tasmanian Regional Forest Agreement, which identified in
excess of 90 000ha of private forest to be managed for conservation (Tasmanian Government,
1998).
The use of stewardship payments is widespread in the United States and Europe, where
subsidies for environmental management are increasingly being substituting for production-
based agricultural subsidises. For example, in the United Kingdom landholders are paid full
annual rental for the management of Sites of Scientific Interest, including sites of biodiversity
value.
3.2.3 Transition incentives
Incentives are paid to encourage compliance and transition to a new regulatory standard, for
example restrictions on the right to clear and/or sub-divide land. Transition payments can be
based on compensation for foregone land-use opportunities, or on the basis of assisting
compliance. The latter approach is generally associated with smaller payments targeted at on-
ground management. Examples in Australia cover this full range, from compensation
requirements for involuntary re-zoning by local government to the modest $15 million
incentives fund associated with the introduction of broad-scale clearing controls in NSW in
1997 (Cripps et.al, 1999).
South Australia’s experience with transition arrangements following the introduction of
clearing controls is described in Box 3.Policy Toolkit




Managing the Transition to Clearing Controls in South Australia
Like the majority of States, both the South Australian and Federal governments encouraged clearance
of native vegetation into the 1970’s. Indeed, many Crown leases include a standard condition requiring
clearance.
In 1977 a committee, established to investigate the extent of clearance, found that over 75% of land in
agricultural regions had been cleared and a significant number of regions had less than 10% of their
original vegetation.
To combat this problem the SA government introduced the South Australian Heritage Agreement
Scheme in 1980. At that time entry into a Heritage Agreement [covenant] was voluntary and based on
the conservation value of the land in question.
By 1982, it was clear that voluntary action would not meet vegetation objectives as only 0.75% of
existing vegetation was covered by an agreement. To address this problem regulations were introduced
in 1983 with no prior warning. Debate over clearance controls led to the Native Vegetation Act being
introduced in 1985, which tied refusal to clear to gaining financial assistance to enter a Heritage
Agreement. $70million was invested in incentives to landholders who enter Heritage Agreements
following refusal to clear land.
The current Native Vegetation Act 1991 ceased financial assistance but maintained strict controls over
land clearance. In rare circumstances where minor clearing is approved it is subject to conditions
requiring replanting or other equivalent conservation works and the development of a management
plan.
The scheme has been very successful in halting clearance. There are now 550,000 ha covered by 1050
Heritage Agreements (only 650 properties received compensation but all 1050 are eligible for
assistance with fencing costs).
The scheme, however, has done very little to promote active conservation management. Many
landholders feel disenfranchised by the process and perceive that the Government is now responsible
for the land. Further, no distinction is made between the quality of vegetation between various sites.
(Source: Young, E. SA Department of Environment and Natural Resources 1997)
3.2.4 Tax incentives
Conservation is one of the most highly taxed land-uses in Australia, particularly on private
land that is not used for primary production, and therefore, cannot access business-related tax
entitlements, including deduction of management costs and negative gearing. Binning and
Young (1999a, 1999b and 1999c) have identified a wide range of impediments created by the
taxation system, and opportunities to provide incentives for private investment in nature
conservation.
Tax incentives are often argued to be a blunt and poorly-targeted policy instrument. However
,they are also an efficient way to market conservation to non-landholders who may be willing
to make philanthropic donations to conservation. They may also facilitate private investment
in dedicated private conservation reserves. Because they use an existing administrative
structure they can represent the most effective means in engaging a wide range of people in
conservation activities. Tax incentives do, however, need to be carefully targeted (Binning
and Young, 1999a).Policy Toolkit
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Property rates and taxes
Property rates and charges are annual charges on land ownership and are generally based on a
fixed proportion of property value. In Australia property rates are applied by both local
government, in the form of rates, and by state governments in the form of land tax.
Exemptions to these taxes are often given to land-uses associated with the provision of public
goods. For example, exemptions are given to charitable organisations, sporting clubs and
religious bodies. On this basis, a similar case could be made for land covered by a legally
binding conservation covenant as proposed in Binning and Young (1999b). Indeed a number
of state and local governments have moved recently to introduce exemptions of this kind -
including New South Wales and Western Australia. Legal impediments remain, however, in
some states to local government pursuing rate rebate programmes.
The Australian analysis of these taxes revealed that the financial impact of property rates and
land taxes varies widely ranging from as little as $2 - $25 per hectare in rural regions to in
excess of $635 per hectare in one cited case on coastal Queensland (Binning and Young,
1999b). Hence the incentive provided by exemptions to property based taxes will vary,
ranging from a purely symbolic gesture in remote rural regions to a significant incentive in
urban and peri-urban areas where land-use pressures, and hence values, are high.
In New Zealand councils have the capacity to offer rate relief. However, this is at the
discretion of individual councils. The level of incentive offered by councils offering rate
rebates is often minimal, meaning the main impact of this incentive is its symbolic and
motivational impact.
Donation of property
Donations of property to registered environmental organisations have not always been tax
deductible. Indeed, until recent amendments to taxation laws were made, only financial
donations have been deductible and then only in the year of donation.
In order to generate debate on how greater donations for environmental philanthropy could be
achieved, an analysis of the Australian treatment of environmental donations was compared to
that of the United States (Binning and Young, 1999c). On the basis of that analysis the
following policy options were identified:
To facilitate the establishment of private conservation reserves, allow all donations of
property to conservation trusts to be tax deductible over five years and exempt from
capital gains tax. The definition of property for the purposes of this recommendation
could be extended to:
•  All land, physical and financial assets
•  Conservation covenants – that is any loss in land value from entering a
conservation covenant
•  Bargain sales of land – that is the gap between sale price to the conservation trust
and the full market value of the land
•  Donations of land with the retained right to occupation of the existing owner
•  Donations of assets for which a limited lifetime annuity is paid.
In April 2000 the Australian parliament passed legislation allowing donations of land to be
tax deductible over five years. Options relating to conservation covenants, bargain sales and
donations with a retained right of occupation are to be further considered during the course of
2000.Policy Toolkit
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Management of private conservation reserves
Private conservation reserves, secured by a conservation covenant, cannot access tax
deductions for the costs of management unless an income-generating business, such as
primary production, is also being undertaken on the land. This has been identified as a key
impediment to the creation of private reserves, particularly on the coastal zone nearby major
urban centres and where many of Australia’s most vulnerable ecological communities are
located.
To address this concern Binning and Young (1999a, 1999c) have identified the following
options for land secured by a binding conservation covenant:
•  Access to tax deductions, or the 34% Landcare rebate, for costs associated with
managing land covered by a conservation covenant
•  Allow private conservation reserves to be negatively geared and give their owners
primary producer status.
The first of these options represents an extension of an existing special incentive in tax law
and is readily implementable. The second is more problematic as it involves extending
business-related tax arrangements to non-income earning activities. Arguments of precedence
and conflict with tax policy principles mitigate against any serious consideration of this
proposal, although it can be justified on public good grounds.
However, this raises an interesting issue related to using environmental markets to derive
income for the provision of environmental services such as biodiversity or carbon. If an
income stream were generated, then business-related tax deductions would become available.
3.2.5 Environmental markets
An alternative approach to direct payments is to create markets for environmental services. In
these cases environmental values are internalised by using regulations or property right
measures to cap resource use a sustainable levels and then allowing markets to determine the
most efficient land-use allocation.
Revolving funds
A revolving fund which purchases land on the open market, places an in-perpetuity covenant
on the land, and then resells it provides an innovative alternative to acquisition programmes
where the capital value of the land and its ongoing costs of management must continue to be
met in perpetuity. As the property right is changed via the covenant, it is more likely that a
landowner committed to vegetation management will purchase the land. In this way the
market works to put a “willing” landholder in the place of an “unwilling” landholder.
In this case a market is created for land that has had additional land-use restrictions placed
upon it. Rationale economic behaviour would suggest some loss in resale of the property to be
experienced. However, the Victorian Trust for Nature’s experience suggests otherwise.
The Trust is the only organisation in Australia currently operating a revolving fund, through
which they have purchased, covenanted and resold approximately 15 properties in the last
three years. The experience of the Trust is useful, as the costs of operating a revolving fund
will vary depending on the marketability of the land purchased. The Trust experienced some
losses in the initial operation of their programme due to transaction costs and loss in the
market value of the land. However, as they have learnt they have generally made a profit by
identifying land that could be readily re-marketed as a conservation property.Policy Toolkit
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However, even if modest losses are experienced the attraction of a revolving fund is that
much of the capital base can be recovered to be reinvested in future land acquisitions. Further,
ongoing liabilities associated with managing the site can be minimised.
Revolving funds are attractive because they are cost effective and also because they may be
more ecologically dependable in terms of final results for biodiversity conservation. As
Farrier (1995) notes, it is difficult, if not impossible, to get a resistant landowner to change
their management practices. This is irrespective of the approach taken: regulations,
information or incentives. By acting in the open market, a dependable landholder identifies
themselves through the market. Moreover, because the seller is usually keen to sell, there is
no need to offer more than market value to secure an area of native vegetation.
Through the Bush for Wildlife component of the Bushcare programme, the Commonwealth
government is committed to the introduction of revolving funds in all Australian states.
Through this process, a number of non-government organisations have recently been provided
with Commonwealth funding to establish funds of this kind.
Tradeable permits
Tradeable water rights and fishing rights are examples of market-based mechanisms that are
being used to regulate resource use. These schemes involve setting an overall cap on resource
use and then allowing rights to that resource to be traded to achieve efficient allocation
between competing resource users.
From an environmental perspective the critical part of this process lies in regulating an
appropriate cap on overall resource use. The market mechanism is somewhat incidental to the
outcome, although it may facilitate acceptance of the programme. A critical challenge
associated with tradeable permit schemes is to ensure that there is capacity to refine and adapt
the regulatory cap through time as scientific knowledge and community values change.
This is particularly important as tradeable permit schemes are often introduced as a measure
of last resort once significant degradation of a key resource is already occurring. In these
cases it may be important to gradually restrict overall allocations over a number of years until
sustainable levels of use are re-achieved.
Environmental certification
Certification and labelling of sustainably produced goods has been put forward for some time
as a way of developing market niches. Accreditation could take place under generic
management system approaches such as ISO 14 000 (International Standards Organisation,
1996) or specific industry-based standards such as those established for forestry by the Forest
Stewardship Council. It is noted that a combination of management systems and standards-
based approaches are required for effective environmental accreditation to take place.
Certification and labelling is having its greatest influence in Europe, particularly in response
to genetically modified foods, which has assisted in driving the market share of organically
grown foods over 10% in Britain for the first time (Radio National ABC, April 2000). It will
be interesting to see if consumer demand is able to sustain a significant price differential.
Markets for environmental services
New markets for environmental services are starting to emerge. The first carbon and salinity
trades in Australia have been recently negotiated by State Forests of NSW in partnership the
Sydney Futures Exchange (carbon) and Macquarie Food and Fibre (salinity) (Bob Smith,
2000). In both these cases the beneficiaries of environmental services have been provided a
market through which they can invest in on-ground works. The carbon example is particularly
interesting as companies seek to hedge risk associated with the Kyoto Protocol by investing in
carbon sinks.Policy Toolkit
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Markets for biodiversity can also be imagined. For example, the Goulbourn-Broken
Catchment in Victoria is contemplating marketing investment in the rehabilitation of
floodplains by marketing conservation shares in Melbourne. Likewise the Australian Bush
Heritage Fund purchases properties of high conservation value with funds raised through
donation.
Internationally, wetland banking in the United States creates markets for the rehabilitation of
degraded wetlands (see case study 4). Further, the US Conservation Reserve Program
involves holding auctions for the provision of conservation services, with government
assistance being provided to those who bid to provide services at the lowest cost. In this way
all rents are extracted from the suppliers of conservation services (Stoneham and Chaudhri,
2000).
Further opportunities lie in other areas such as water purification. In one celebrated case the
services of water filtration and purification provided by ecosystems in the catchment for New
York City were estimated to be worth at least US$8 billion, which was the difference between
the cost of repairing the ecosystems and building artificial filtration facilities to replace the
degraded capacity of the ecosystem services (Chichilnisky and Heal 1998). This study has
been used as the basis for investing in on-ground works to restore the catchment. In a study of
Melbourne’s water catchment, recommendations for timber harvesting regimes were based
partly on avoiding or minimising the costs of decreased water or timber yields under a range
of scenarios (Read Sturgess and Associates 1992).
Markets of this kind are only beginning to emerge in Australia. They have great potential but
will require regulatory and property right structures that create scarcity and hence demand for
these services.
In rural landscapes a particular challenge is how to bundle or package services associated with
re-establishing areas of native vegetation. Table 2 alerts us to the potential by speculating on
what a diversified farm business might look like in 20 years’ time. In the table traditional
agricultural business outputs account for 55% of total output. Areas of land rehabilitated
provide benefits through timber, carbon credits, salinity mitigation, water filtration and
biodiversity. These benefits are sold to different clients in a mature market place that has
defined and quantified the flows of valued services from the farm.
Table 2: Example of commodities produced by a farm business in 20 years
Commodity Share of farm business
(Net Present Value)
Client
Wheat 40% World Market
Wool 15% World Market
Timber 10% Pulp Wood
Specialty Timber Merchants
Carbon Credits 7.5% Japanese Steel Company
Salinity Credit 7.5% Catchment Management
Authority – cost sharing fund
Water Filtration Credit 15% Water Board
Biodiversity Credit 5% Philanthropic Trust
To achieve this vision, methods that can account for the various environmental services
flowing from on-ground works are required. Further mechanisms for separating the ownership
of environmental services from land are also required.Policy Toolkit
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3.3 SECURITY –P ROPERTY RIGHT AND LAND-USE PLANNING
TOOLS
At any point in time, responsibilities for land management are defined through the policies
and legal institutions that regulate land management practices. Land ownership can be
described in terms of a series of entitlements and obligations, such as the right to graze and
the obligation to protect areas of significant indigenous vegetation. Property rights are not
only defined by legislation but also by the implementation programmes and enforcement
regimes associated with legislation. It is not uncommon for regulations and land-use plans to
fail because they were never implemented or enforced (Brasden, 1991).
It is important to note that property rights can be defined at any scale ranging from national
legislation to individual property agreements that may only affect a small portion of a block
of land. Further, property right mechanisms are not always regulatory in nature and may be
entered into willingly, as is the case with voluntary conservation covenants.
However, as has been noted, regulatory structures have a fundamental role in the policy mix
in terms of establishing minimum standards for environmental management.
Key examples of regulatory, land-use planning and property right-based instruments are
outlined below. The potential for complementarity between these tools in appropriately
defining property rights at different scales should be noted.
3.3.1 National legislation
National legislation establishes the framework for biodiversity management. Key acts in New
Zealand include Resource Management Act 1991, Conservation Act 1987, Biosecurity Act
1993, Fisheries Act 1996 and the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996.
The role of national legislation in establishing minimum standards and facilitating the creation
outcome based regional structures has been discussed extensively in section 2 and will not be
repeated here.
3.3.2 Regional and local scale regulation
A wide range of tools is available to plan for and regulate land-use at local scales. These tools
are, of course, familiar and essential to planners. A useful distinction can be drawn between
strategic planning, local planning and tools for rezoning land. Table 3 outlines a number of
local and regional planning tools used in Australia.
Table 3: Examples of regional and local planning tools
Strategic Planning Local Planning Re-zoning
•  Development and settlement
planning
•  Regional policy statements
•  Pest and fire management
•  Offsets policies
•  Tree and vegetation
protection by-laws
•  Open space, local reserve and
recreation management




•  Revolving funds
(Binning and Thorman, 1999)Policy Toolkit
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Particular challenges in adapting existing planning frameworks lie in the following areas:
•  integrating biodiversity values into existing natural resource management and land-
use planning processes that have traditionally focused on development,
infrastructure, recreation and land management issues;
•  ensuring biodiversity on public land is appropriately managed;
•  developing land-use plans that effectively conserve sites of significant biodiversity
through appropriate zoning ahead of development pressures; and
•  developing mechanisms to cost effectively re-zone land that is inappropriately zoned
whilst ensuring landholders are treated equitably and fairly.
Strategic planning
Effectively integrating biodiversity into existing strategic development planning processes is
perhaps the most significant challenge facing planners at local and regional scales. It is at the
strategic level that the fundamental and underlying causes of biodiversity loss. For example,
in the Hunter and Central Coast regions of NSW the key pressure on biodiversity is from
population growth, currently in excess of 3% per annum, and associated urban development.
Addressing the impact of population growth requires careful planning that ensures that the
design of future urban areas and rural subdivisions takes explicit account of biodiversity by
setting aside appropriate areas for conservation (Binning and Thorman, 1999).
In practice this means that biodiversity value must be mapped and included as data layers in
geographic land-use planning databases, and that rules for taking account of these values are
developed. Further, training in conservation planning may be required for planners who may
also be required to shift their culture.
A wide range of tools is available for spatial biodiversity planning. Examples include
Bio-Rap, a set of tools developed by CSIRO for mapping, assessing and setting priorities for
biodiversity conservation (Margules, 1995) and Local Greening Plans, a guide developed by
Greening Australia for developing local biodiversity plans (Greening Australia, 1995).
A related strategic issue is taking biodiversity values into account in other planning processes
including fire, pest and weed management (Binning, Smyth and Catling, 2000).
Whilst strategic planning involves significant up-front costs, it has the potential to
significantly reduce the costs of regulating land-use to protect biodiversity. If land is
appropriately zoned from the beginning there is less scope for conflict and more scope to
streamline approval processes and give greater certainty to developers.
Local planning instruments
Local planning laws are critical to interpret higher scale regulations and apply them to local
circumstances. Often discretion is allowed at a local level, making the development of
appropriate local plans critical to their on-ground interpretation and implementation.
Examples of local planning tools commonly used in Australia include tree preservation
orders, habitat corridor and linkage policies, development control plans regulating clearing of
endangered species and communities, and recreation management.
Other more innovative tools may include offset and development incentive policies. Offset
policies require impacts on biodiversity to be offset by other works in the region that yield a
net benefit to the environment. An example of an offsets programme, wetland banking, from
the United States is described in case study 6.Policy Toolkit
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Developments which minimise the impact on native vegetation can be achieved through
development incentives, e.g. higher density development is permitted when other land is set
aside for conservation or open space.
Cessnock City Council (NSW) have taken this approach by using their Local Environment
Plan and associated Development Control Plans (DCP) to allow high density development
provided that vegetation corridors or other strategically-positioned vegetation plantings are
established and maintained in perpetuity. The DCP fosters a policy of no vegetation loss.
Similarly, we have been advised that Gosford Shire Council has a development incentive
programme aimed at protecting natural habitat. However, no details on this policy have been
provided.
The Gold Coast City Council in Queensland is another interesting case study where higher
density development is permitted to compensate for setting other land aside as open space
within their hinterland. This policy has had mixed success as the resulting small cluster
developments have led to increased infrastructure costs and pressures.
3.3.3 Property scale tools
Property agreements, management agreements and conservation covenants are all terms for
formal agreement between a landholder and a third party, usually government, to manage an
area of privately-owned land for conservation. An agreement secures conservation outcomes
by defining management objectives for the land. It sets out those land-uses that are permitted
and excluded in much the same way as is done through land-use zoning. Provision may also
be made for the development of a management plan (Binning and Young, 1997a).
Management agreements can be distinguished from local planning instruments because they
have generally been entered into voluntarily.
Management agreements can be of varying levels of security ranging from non-binding, as is
the case with the Land for Wildlife programme in Australia, through to covenants that are
binding in perpetuity. The Queen Elizabeth II National Trust allows for the negotiation of
both “in perpetuity” and “fixed term” conservation covenants in New Zealand.
A critical issue in designing management agreement programmes lies in achieving an
appropriate balance between securing change in property right entitlements and administrative
cost. Covenants are complex agreements that may be costly and time consuming to negotiate.
Further, they place obligation on both the landholder and the covenanting organisation. For
example, it is recommended that a qualified facilitation officer visit covenanted properties at
least every two years (Binning and Young, 1997a). These requirements suggest that the use of
covenants should be limited to high conservation value sites where active stewardship is
required from the landholder. On the other hand, a simple binding 10-year contract may be
sufficient when providing catalytic incentives such as fencing grants for the establishment of
a wildlife corridor.
A major issue in the use of management agreements is enhancing the capacity of non-
government organisations to develop and negotiate agreements with landholders (see Section
3.2)
An interesting application of management agreements in Australia has been their increased
use by local governments who encourage voluntary rezoning by landholders committed to
conservation through incentives such as rate rebates. This option is often taken up by
landholders who fear that rising land values and local rates will ultimately force subdivision
of their land.Policy Toolkit
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3.4 PRINCIPLES FOR POLICY DESIGN
An overview of a wide range of policies and programmes that can be used to achieve on-
ground actions that conserve native vegetation have been reviewed in this section of the
report. In the next section of the report a number of Australian and international case studies
are used to demonstrate how these tools can be mixed and applied at different scales of
management.
Before doing this doing this it is important to draw attention to a number of important design
principles.
First, as already noted, there is a need to ensure that a mix of educational, incentive and
regulatory based mechanisms are used.
Second, there is an issue of ordering policy development. Awareness raising through
education is a critical first step, but is demonstrated to have little influence on short term
behavioural change. Likewise, financial incentives are likely to be ineffective until awareness
is raised and landholder attitudes shifted toward positive management of biodiversity.
Regulations have also been demonstrated to fail in the absence of strong community support
(Brasden, 1991). This suggests that an ideal policy approach involves: awareness raising to
shift attitudes, financial incentives to assist in meeting the transition to more sustainable
management, and regulations to secure the community’s investment in improved
management.
Of course this policy ordering can be changed in certain circumstances. For example, when
seeking to quickly achieve significant changes behaviour it may be more effective to regulate
than educate. A celebrated case is that of imposing regulations requiring seat belts in cars or,
perhaps less famously, the introduction land clearing controls. The process creates debate and
may succeed in shifting community preferences. Whilst undoubtedly successful in some
circumstances, such approaches are riskier and require greater political capital.
Third, related to policy ordering, are principles that guide the emphasis placed on each of the
different categories of instrument. If dramatic structural change is required in a short time
frame regulatory changes imposed by central government, coupled with incentive payments
that facilitate transition by compensating landholders, may be preferred. However, strategies
for achieving incremental change ideally place greater emphasis on education backed by
incentives to achieve greater awareness and uptake.
Fourth, successful approaches to biodiversity management are complex and hence require
time to develop, secure resources, implement and gain community acceptance and uptake.
The most successful regional approaches we are aware of have taken in excess of 10 years to
develop and are characterised by strong leadership and continuity in key staff (Binning,
Cripps and Young, 1999). Stable regional structures that are able to learn and adapt are
critical to achieving this outcome.
Fifth, an adaptive approach to biodiversity planning and implementation policies is required.
Action should be taken whenever there is confidence that a substantial contribution to
regional conservation objectives can be achieved. However, improvements to the information
base and feedback from ongoing monitoring are essential elements of any successful approach
(Holling, 1978; International Standards Organisation, 1996a, 1996b). The process of adaptive
management applied to developing successful approaches to native vegetation management is
described in Box 4.
The approach outlined in the Box serves to draw together and link the key lessons learnt from
the separate discussions of institutional design and policy tools. It also provides a useful
backdrop to the six case studies that are presented in the next section.Case Studies
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4. CASE STUDIES 
Case Study 1 – Australian National Policy Approaches to Vegetation
Management
The Australian Federal Government is committed to an objective of reversing the long-term
decline in the quality and extent of Australia’s native vegetation by June 2001. This is an
ambitious target that is unlikely to be achieved.
A complex range of policies and programmes are in place to promote the achievement of this
goal including the following (ANZECC, 2000).
•  National and state regulations, policies and institutions including land clearing
and threatened species legislation in most states.
•  Planning and assessment frameworks for inventory, data mapping, assessment
and planning for biodiversity conservation.
•  Creation of a comprehensive, adequate and representative national reserve system
that may, where appropriate, include private reserves.
•  Communication and capacity building strategies for both planners and
landholders to take account of biodiversity values.
•  Financial incentives underpinned by grants available through the $1.3 billion
Natural Heritage Trust (established through the partial sale of Telstra).
•  Monitoring and evaluation strategies that assess the quality and extent of native
vegetation.
Through the Natural Heritage Trust the government has invested in the full range of activities.
The increase in investment has yielded many benefits with biodiversity effectively being
raised to the profile of other natural resource management issues.
However, challenges remain. Clearing of native vegetation still outstrips revegetation and
rehabilitation activities, with Queensland a particular hotspot. Regional structures for natural
resource management remain poorly resourced and are generally not effectively integrated
into other decision-making structures. Impediments to the use of the full suite of policy
instruments identified in this report remain, particularly for the non-government sector. Grant
programmes need to be more effectively targeted to high priority on-ground works and tied to
appropriate property right instruments (Dore, Binning and Hayes, 1999).
These challenges highlight the need for central government to achieve a balance in the range
of activities in which they are involved. It is not effective to simply invest in on-ground works
whilst other processes that degrade biodiversity continue. A balanced approach by central
government requires investment in the following areas.
•  Institutional reform – including establishment of minimum standards,
clarification of roles and responsibilities, funding and removal of impediments to
the use of the full suite of policy instruments.
•  Capacity building – including education, inventory and mapping, and provision
of expertise in biodiversity planning, programme implementation and monitoring.
•  On-ground works – provided funding to targeted investment in high priority on-
ground conservation works.
•  Monitoring and adaptive management – measuring progress, learning and
adapting.
The Federal Government has invested in all of these areas but many challenges remain. This
emphasises the critical role of national governments in leading the development of effective
approaches to biodiversity conservation.Case Studies
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Case Study 2 – Regional Planning – Brisbane City Council
Brisbane City Council has an impressive vegetation management programme in place. This is
designed around the combined objectives of maintaining open space and hence amenity in the
city and conserving biodiversity.
The range of mechanisms used by Brisbane City includes the following:
•  Strategic Town Planning which includes explicit planning through the development
of District Open Space Plans which take account of biodiversity values.
•  Vegetation Protection Orders and Non Urban Zoning are the regulatory and
statutory processes used to protect native vegetation within the city. Vegetation
Protection Orders (VPOs), that have the effect of making vegetation clearance a
development that requires approval by the council, were introduced in 1991 and
targeted at key natural areas and sites. In addition, land within the city may be zoned
into one of three non-urban conservation zones.
•  Environment Levy of $30 per ratepayer per annum is used to acquire key sites
within the city. Ratepayers subject to a VPO are exempt from the levy. Initially funds
were borrowed against the levy to facilitate the purchase of significant sites. The levy
now funds repayments of the loan and purchase of additional sites. The fund is
managed separately from Council revenue and enjoys strong community support.
•  Management of Council Land is a high priority task within the council. The council
is developing management plans for major natural areas within the city, with a
commitment to extensive public consultation and ongoing participation.
•  Voluntary Conservation Agreement (VCA) are used to encourage private
landholders to set aside and manage land for nature conservation. Two types of
agreement are offered: A General Agreement, which involves entering a Deed of
Agreement to manage the land for conservation; and a Higher Agreement, which
involves both a Deed of Agreement and rezoning the land to a non-urban
conservation zone. Land for Wildlife also provides landholders with the option of a
non-binding way of participating in nature conservation activities within the city.
•  Financial Assistance is available to landholders entering VCA’s. It is calculated as a
proportion of the value of the property up to a set maximum of $1000 and $1500 per
annum for General and Higher Agreements respectively. Assistance is essentially in
the form of a rate rebate, however the council has taken the important step of tying
assistance with the costs associated with ongoing management.
•  Community Grants are provided to groups to undertake management works.
•  Monitoring of Vegetation Loss. In the eight years prior to 1991 when VPOs were
introduced the city lost one fifth of its vegetation. Since that time the rate of clearance
has been significantly slowed.
Officers at the council emphasised that a strong mix of instruments is required, as the
circumstances where a particular instrument is appropriate will vary. The planning processes
identify key habitats, remnants and corridors requiring protection. However, successfully
engaging the landholders has required a range of policy options to be developed through
which conservation objectives can be satisfactorily met.
Another lesson that can be learnt is the importance of stable institutional structures that allow
complex conservation programmes to be developed over time. Notably Brisbane City is
Australia’s only major city to be covered by a single regional council and this undoubtedly
facilitates achievement of special programmes. It has resources is excess of $1 billion
annually. It has developed its conservation programme progressively over 10 years with a
small unit of committed staff.Case Studies
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Case Study 3 – Property Scale Programmes – Greening Australia Fencing
Assistance
Greening Australia – Fencing Assistance
Greening Australia, a non-government organisation committed to re-establishing native
vegetation, administer a programme funded by the Natural Heritage Trust that assists


















Figure 8 Greening Australia Fencing Assistance: An example of a targeted incentive.
The programme is very simply structured and involves the following:
•  an incentives fund is created which is available to all landholders in the region;
•  access to the incentive fund is broadly advertised promoting its objectives and
administrative simplicity;
•  landholders apply by simply expressing interest in the programme via a phone call or
one page form lodged with Greening Australia;
•  all landholders who express interest in the programme are visited by a facilitation
officer who assesses potential sites on the property, provides free management advice
and, if requested develops an application for funding on-site;
•  all applications are ranked on the basis to which they contribute to catchment and
biodiversity objectives;
•  funding is approved to the highest ranked sites and provided by the facilitation officer
at a rate of $1200 per kilometre of fencing; and
•  landholders enter a 10-year management agreement to maintain the fences and
manage the site for nature conservation.
The attraction of this kind of programme is that a relatively small incentive is used as a
catalyst to encourage landholders to take conservation activities on their properties. It
demonstrates that small, simple and administratively efficient programmes can be developed
at a property scale that still achieve an appropriate mix of policy instruments. This is achieved
by combining individual facilitation, financial incentives and property right instruments, in
the form of a management agreement.
Variations of this type of agreement can easily be envisaged. For example, larger cost-sharing
or stewardship payments may be coupled to entry into binding conservation covenants.
Similarly transition incentives tied to facilitation services may promote acceptance of changes
in land-use regulation.Case Studies
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Case Study 4 – Environmental Markets – Wetland Banking in the United
States
Wetland banking has been in place in the USA since the mid-1970s. It allows for
developments that affect wetlands to be offset by off site remediation works. By 1992 in
excess of 40 banks were operating in the USA that had facilitated the rehabilitation of about
20,000 acres of wetland. There are now several hundred wetland banks in operation
throughout the United States (Environment Law Institute, 1993).
In recent times the concept of mitigation banking has been extended to the protection of
habitat for species listed under the USA’s Endangered Species Act.
Wetland mitigation involves protection, restoration, creation and/or enhancement of wetlands
for the purpose of compensating for unavoidable loss of wetlands in advance of development
actions when such compensation cannot be achieved at the development site or would not be
as environmentally beneficial.
A wetland bank is created when a sponsoring organisation undertakes a major restoration
task. Once the restoration project is completed credits are provided for the value of the work
undertaken. Different credit rates can be given for creation, restoration, or protection of
wetlands. These credits can then be used to offset adverse impacts on other wetland areas
caused by development. New developments that affect wetlands must buy credits to satisfy a
prescribed impact rate. Hence a combination of the credit and impact rate determines the ratio
between the area restored and the area affected by development. A committee, constituted of
representatives from relevant regulatory authorities, generally sets both credit and impact
rates on a project by project basis. Net rates can vary widely from 1:2 (i.e. development of
one hectare of wetland requires an offset of two hectares of remediation work offsite) to as
high as 1:20 (Environment Law Institute (1993). Wetland mitigation banking, Environment
Law Institute, 1993).
Key features of wetland banking include:
•  Wetland banking has no impact on regulatory approval processes for environmental
projects;
•  Mitigation works have to be completed prior to credits being drawn upon; and
•  Large scale and strategically-targeted conservation works can be undertaken that
provide much greater environmental benefits per dollar invested than small scale on-
site remediation activities.
Wetland banking has facilitated large scale rehabilitation works that would otherwise not have
been possible. The process has proven highly profitable for a number of environment
rehabilitation companies who are able to on-sell to developers seeking to off-set impacts prior
to development being approved. Benefits have also been provided to developers who now
have greater certainty and a mechanism for offsetting adverse impacts.
The application of this type of model to a catchment or region in Australia or New Zealand
would be extremely challenging. Rules for assigning credits for conservation works would
need to be developed. Likewise rules for assessing impact of approved developments would
also have to be calculated. An example of a set of rules is set out in Table 4.
Key lessons that can be learnt from wetland trading are that regulations coupled with market
mechanisms can be used to achieve least cost solutions to environmental problems. In this
case the polluter pays and, if rehabilitation works are strategically targeted, a net
improvement to the environment delivered.
Care does need to be taken, however, to ensure that trading is not used to justify irreversible
loss of core environmental assets. A second concern relates to ensuring that the transactionCase Studies
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costs associated with creating markets do not outweigh improvements in environmental
outcomes and economic efficiency.






Planting individual trees 3:1 A high rate because planting of individual trees does
little to restore habitat.
The majority of the benefits derived from planting of
this kind are associated with landscape amenity.
Revegetation and habitat
r e c o n s t r u c t i o ni na na r e an o t
identified in a Regional
Conservation Plan.
2:1 A moderate rate because although the works create
habitat they are not strategically located within the
landscape and hence are of lesser value to biodiversity
conservation.
Revegetation or rehabilitation
of strategic sites identified
through a Regional
Conservation Plan.
1:1 A low rate because the project is strategic in its nature
and makes a direct contribution to the Conservation
Plan.
Protection of currently
unprotected sites identified as
having high conservation
value (eg by rezoning).
2:1 A moderate rate chosen to reflect that fact that although
a strategic site has been protected, no additional habitat
has been established, hence making trading for
vegetation loss in other areas problematic.
Vegetation Debits
Removal of isolated trees. 1:1 A low rate as removal of isolated trees has limited
impacts on biodiversity although impacts on local
amenity may be high.
Disturbance or removal of a
vegetation community
represented at greater than
30% pre-European
distribution.
1:1.5 A low to moderate rating as the vegetation is well
represented within the shire, but nevertheless is likely
to provide habitat at a landscape scale.
Disturbance or removal of a
vegetation community
identified as of high
conservation value in the
Conservation Plan.
1:3 A high rate reflecting the fact that areas of strategic
importance to biodiversity conservation within the
Shire are being affected. Hence the offset needs to be
set at a relatively high level.
Disturbance or removal of an
endangered vegetation
community or community
known to contain endangered
species.
1:5 A very high rate justified on the grounds of the high
cost to the community of losing critical habitat to
development. It is assumed that such developments
would only be approved following a stringent approval
process that demonstrated outstanding value of the
development to the community.
It is assumed there are significant economic rents
associated with the development that should be
returned to the community.
# The ratios presented in this table are indicative and are derived from those put forward by Pacific International
Engineering (1999) for wetland trading in the USA. The ratios presented here are a guide only and may be varied
according to the contribution/impact of rehabilitation works/development on project by project basis.
*The credit ratio is the quantity of remediation required to earn a single vegetation credit; the debt ratio is the cost
of a quantity of impact (eg acres cleared) in credits.Case Studies
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Case Study 5 –Regional Planning - The Hunter and Central Coast Region
The Lower Hunter and Central Coast Region have been developing a Regional Biodiversity
Strategy for several years. To date emphasis has been placed on collecting data on the
distribution and condition of different ecological communities within the region.
The region, north of Sydney, is one of Australia’s fastest growing population corridors and is
experiencing extreme development pressures, particularly in the lowland coastal areas that
contain the region’s most threatened ecosystems.
Options for developing an implementation programme have been developed and address the
full range of institutional issues and policy instruments identified in this report (Binning and
Thorman, 1999).
•  It was proposed that a board of management be established to coordinate actions
across three key state agencies and nine local councils.
•  A balance of planning tools were identified that seek to integrate biodiversity into
strategic planning decisions, audit and improve the management of public land,
facilitate rezoning of high priority sites, and implement offsets policies for clearing
native vegetation.
•  A voluntary conservation programme for encouraging conservation of private land
was designed placing emphasis on the provision of facilitation support, management
agreements and financial incentives.
•  Communication and education programmes were also identified
•  The need for monitoring programmes was highlighted to facilitate adaptive
management.
•  Funding strategies were identified and discussed.
In all over 50 priority actions were identified with a potential cost of $70 million. To address
the potentially unacceptable cost, three options where put to the region: status quo, a
planning-based approach and full implementation.
The region is struggling to act on basis of this advice, even in relation to the highest priority
recommendations. This is primarily because of the resources required and the potential impact
on development interests. The key lesson is that well-designed programmes do not emerge
instantaneously, but rather take time to develop.
Small programmes that enjoy modest on-ground success are required to demonstrate the
importance of taking action, thereby securing greater resources and political will to take a
larger step. Adaptive approaches to policy development are required, not just for
environmental reasons, but also to address social and economic impediments.
The lesson to be drawn is that regional programmes may have long start-up lead times and
may well gain impetus from smaller short term linking programmes which successfully
implement outcomes that have a high community visibility.Case Studies
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Case Study 6 – Engaging the Private Sector - The Nature Conservancy
The Nature Conservancy is a non-profit organisation established in the United States. The
Nature Conservancy uses non-traditional market based solutions to protect land that is of high
conservation value. The mission of the Nature Conservancy is ‘to preserve the plants, animals
and natural communities that represent the diversity of life on Earth by protecting the lands
and water they need to survive’.
The Conservancy currently operates the largest private system of nature sanctuaries in the
world with more than 1600 reserves in the United States. Originally, the Conservancy
achieved its goal by simply purchasing land of high conservation value from willing sellers.
However, to increase effectiveness and to extend its role, the Conservancy now protects land
through gifts, exchanges, conservation easements, management agreements, debt-for-nature
swaps, and management partnerships (see the discussion of mechanisms).
The Nature Conservancy now protects more than 9 million acres of ecologically significant
land in the United States.The Conservancy places primary importance on developing
partnerships with landholders, businesses, academic institutions and government. Some
examples are:
•  Aluminium Company of America (Alcoa) and The Nature Conservancy signed a
cooperative agreement in January 1996 that will result in the conservation and
management of 1058 acres in Arkansas, USA;
•  A partnership was established in 1996 between the New Jersey Chapter of The
Nature Conservancy and a utility company called Public Service Electric and Gas
Company (PS&G). Under contract the Conservancy is required to manage 16,000
acres of land owned by PS&G, which is home to 376 rare plants, animals and
natural communities. 101 of these are listed by the State of New Jersey as
endangered;
•  Microsoft co-founder Paul G. Allen pledged to donate $5 million to The Nature
Conservancy of Washington in January 1997 in the form of a Challenge Grant
donated through the Paul G. Allen Forest Protection Foundation. The Foundation
will donate $1 for every $2 donated to the Conservancy until the $5 million limit
is reached. Allen’s intention is to spur additional private donations to a total of
$15 million.
Through innovative programmes of this kind the Conservancy has become one of the top 10
charities in the United States. This demonstrates the increased importance of nature
conservation to individuals and corporations, who between them provide 80% of funding for
The Nature Conservancy. Whilst The Nature Conservancy is limited by a reliance on
donations and investments, this has encouraged innovative ways of expanding the
programme. Today annual turnover exceeds $US450 million.
In more recent years the Conservancy has begun to undertake political advocacy both within
the USA and in other countries in which it works. This is a significant shift that needs to be
managed carefully to ensure the organisation does not marginalise itself and thereby threaten
its donor base.
The US experience highlights the largely untapped potential of the non-government sector in
New Zealand and Australia. It provides a model for developing partnerships between
community-based organisations, businesses and government.
Non-government organisations may have greater capacity to develop links and markets
between values of urban populations and regional communities that are the stewards of
biodiversity.Application to New Zealand
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5. APPLICATION TO NEW ZEALAND 
In this final section of the report the concepts and principles identified up until this point are
applied to the situation in New Zealand. It is timely to reflect on these issues in the context of
the recent completion of the New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy and the near completion of
the work of the Ministerial Advisory Committee considering issues associated with protecting
biodiversity on private land.
To this point an Australian perspective on how to develop pragmatic approaches to
conserving biodiversity has been given. Ultimately success will be defined through on-ground
programmes that target and reward land managers who actively manage biodiversity on their
land – be it private or public land.
However, it has been revealed that the pathway to this outcome is rather more complex.
Rather than blaming land managers, it is necessary to understand the economic and social
factors that are driving the land-uses and management practices that are causing the
continuing loss of biodiversity. Policy responses to these socio-economic drivers require
biodiversity values to be integrated into markets and with government policy responses to
other natural resource management issues.
Institutional reforms are required that clarify roles and responsibilities for biodiversity
management and ensure that local and regional institutions have the capacity to assess and
develop programmes that address biodiversity in ways that are locally relevant. Engagement
of the private sector is also required, particularly to develop markets for the services provided
by biodiversity. Markets that connect urban and rural communities are an especially urgent
need.
Further, a wide range of policies and programmes will ultimately be required to effectively
engage landholders. A toolkit of education, incentive, and property right-based instruments
has been outlined. The need to draw on the full suite of these instruments has been
highlighted, as has the need for adaptive development of programmes.
The analysis of existing policies and programmes in New Zealand is based on the outcomes
of consultations with government officials and key stakeholders in May 2000.The section is
structured as follows:
•  Context is set by a brief discussion of the unique nature of biodiversity in New
Zealand and the challenge of identifying appropriate objectives for the
implementation of the Biodiversity Strategy.
•  Key institutional issues are discussed drawing on the analysis in Section 2 of the
report.
•  Options for implementing the full suite of policy tools discussed in Section 3 are
identified.
•  Finally a framework for accountability, monitoring and adaptive implementation
of the Biodiversity Strategy is discussed.
Policy options are identified at the end of each section for consideration of governments and
stakeholders.
The analysis contained in this final section of the report is an outsider’s perspective based on
a brief visit and desktop review of key policies and programme documentation.Application to New Zealand
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5.1 CONTEXT FOR BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION IN NEW
ZEALAND
New Zealand has a unique biodiversity shaped by over 80 million years of isolation that has
resulted in high levels of endemism. Because of this isolation, and comparatively recent
human settlement, much of New Zealand’s biodiversity is extremely sensitive to disturbance
from humans and introduced pests.
Introduced weeds and pests including possums, stoats, rats, cats, ferrets, goats, deer, pigs and
mice, and approximately 220 environmental weeds, present particular challenges for the
management of indigenous biodiversity. The general statement can be made that in the
absence of active ongoing management many of the values of natural areas are being lost.
Further, effective pest and weed management is a costly exercise with full control in all areas
beyond the combined resources of landholders and public agencies.
Because of the need for ongoing management, conservation strategies need to be balanced
between broader landscape objectives and the need to intensively manage a representative
range of areas of indigenous biodiversity for the full range of species. This distinction is
perhaps best captured in the concept of more intensive management of mainland islands.
However, the Biodiversity Strategy notes that biodiversity conservation is more than simply
the creation of network of reserves. Figure 9 places the role of biodiversity management in the
context of a broader framework of landscape conservation. Two primary drivers are
identified: landscape amenity, which addresses cultural, historic and human-based values;
and, ecosystem health which addresses the role of ecological processes in providing goods
and services which individuals and society value. Within this framework individual strategies
for the management of natural resource management issues can be identified. In this case
catchment management, indigenous biodiversity and pest management have been highlighted.
Figure 9 – Scope of biodiversity management
The figure draws our attention to the need to integrate across land-use objectives. This is
particularly important when considering the role of private land in meeting natural resource
management objectives. Landholders think holistically and have difficulty in responding to
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In Australia integrated approaches to the management of biodiversity have been required for a
number of reasons. First, agricultural practices have been the cause of a variety of land
degradation processes that can be directly attributed to the loss of ecological function.
Examples include dryland salinity, increased salinisation and nutrification of water ways, soil
acidity and increased pest loads in cropping systems. Further, the rehabilitation of natural
areas of native vegetation is seen as integral to addressing these problems. Second, the
conservation of a representative range of biodiversity requires the establishment of
partnerships with land managers. This is because many of Australia’s most vulnerable
ecosystems occur on fertile soils and along the coastal strip where good quality sites are
difficult to find because of extensive habitat fragmentation. Coastal lowland communities,
temperate grasslands and woodlands are good examples of ecological communities of this
kind in Australia. Third, Australia’s landscapes are rich in biodiversity that is of intrinsic
value to local communities for their sense of place and stewardship of the natural
environment.
In our consultations with officials and stakeholders, we have been presented with mixed
views on whether holistic approaches to biodiversity conservation are required or whether a
model of protection through dedicated public and private (covenanted) conservation reserves
will be sufficient to achieve the conservation of biodiversity. The issue is not whether
protection is necessary – but whether it is sufficient.
The New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy devotes considerable attention to community
participation and awareness (Theme 8), and a separate Ministerial Advisory Committee has
been commissioned to assess the impacts of private land management on indigenous
biodiversity and develop recommendations for the consideration of government. In these
documents attention is drawn to the need to raise awareness and engage landholders,
particularly to achieve conservation outcomes in New Zealand’s lowland and coastal
environments.
Nevertheless, it must be recognised that production systems based on introduced biodiversity
are more resilient and less dependent on indigenous biodiversity than Australian ecosystems.
Further, the need for costly and intensive management of priority regions for the conservation
of pest sensitive species highlights the critical role of the creation of secure formal reserves.
The view taken in this report is that both focused protection strategies and broader strategies
for landholder engagement and participation are required. However, careful consideration will
need to be given to defining the objectives of conservation efforts outside the formal
conservation estate. These objectives will relate to a broader suite of values. Hence, a key task
is to integrate and interpret all natural resource management objectives at regional and local
scales and to identify their relevance and coincidence with the objective of conserving
biodiversity.
Objectives for conservation outside the formal conservation estate will inevitably seek human,
economic and environmental outcomes. It is important that these are defined so that
monitoring and strategies for adaptive management can be put in place.Application to New Zealand
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5.2 INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR BIODIVERSITY
CONSERVATION
5.2.1 Clarifying Roles and Responsibilities of Central and Local
Government
A useful starting point is to provide a brief overview of the roles and responsibilities of
different agencies and spheres of government with a direct role in managing biodiversity.7
Department of Conservation: The Department of Conservation (DOC) is the lead
agency for conservation at central government level. It manages approximately one
third of New Zealand’s land base. The department has a budget of approximately
$190 million of which approximately $92 million is devoted to management of the
existing conservation estate, $58 million to recreation and visitor management, $17.5
million to protection of new sites through acquisition and covenants on private land;
and the remainder of fulfilling advisory and other functions (Treasury, 1999).
In the context of this study, the Nature Heritage Fund and Nga Whenua Rahui are of
particular interest. These funds are contestable allowing a range of organisations to
bid for funding to assist in the management of biodiversity. The Nature Heritage Fund
has an impressive record with 171,000 ha including 44,000 ha of covenants protecting
land in the 10 years of its operation at a cost of approximately $26.5 million. The Nga
Whenua Rahui has negotiated partnerships for the protection of 112,000 ha of Maori
owned land at a cost of $14 million. These trusts are able to provide funding to
regional and district councils and to non-government organisations.
Ministry for the Environment The Ministry for the Environment (MfE) coordinates
the development of environmental standards and guidelines to help local authorities
and resource users implement their responsibilities under the Resource Management
Act 1991 (RMA). Standards and guidelines help define the “environmental bottom
line” of sustainable management described by the Act by setting values and targets
for environmental quality.
In October 1995, the MfE published a paper detailing principles and processes for developing
standards and guidelines (MfE, 1995). These include the principle that standards and
guidelines should prescribe the minimum amount of regulation to best achieve the desired
environmental outcome, that they should consider the impacts on other parts of the
ecosystem, and that they should employ a precautionary approach which takes account of the
uncertainty in measuring environmental quality. The paper also states that standards should be
developed only where the advantages of protecting national values or providing national
consistency outweigh the advantages of national resource management.
The process of developing standards and guidelines aims to ensure widespread public
consultation and peer review.
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
(MAF) has responsibility for sustainable land management programmes and is the
lead Crown agency for terrestrial biodiversity. This covers the quarantine, importation
and monitoring of pests and unwanted organisms.
7 Only a brief overview of the key agencies is provided here. More detailed summaries of the structure
of governance for natural resource management in New Zealand are provided in the The State of New
Zealand’s Environment (Ministry for the Environment, 1999); Biowhat: Preliminary Report of the
Ministerial Advisory Committee (2000); and the New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy (2000)Application to New Zealand
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The Biosecurity Act 1993 provides for pest management strategies. These may be
prepared by government, local government or the private sector. Criteria for
identifying the need for a pest management strategy are not just environmental; they
include consideration of economic well-being, cultural concerns, as well as the
viability of rare or endangered species, soil structure and water quality.
Regional councils: have responsibility for a wide range of natural resource
management activities under the RMA and other Acts including the development of
pest management strategies under the Biosecurity Act 1993. Regional councils have
primary responsibility for coordinating and setting policy for resource management
including water, soil, conservation and transport.
Regional councils have key responsibilities in assessing conservation values and
developing appropriate local responses. Under the RMA these functions are fully
devolved with central government having limited direct involvement, other than
through the development of national policies and strategies, the use of which has been
limited to date.
Regional councils are self-funded through property rates, user charges and returns on
investments.
City and district councils: have complementary functions to regional councils at a
local scale. They cover water supply, control of land development, recreational
facilities including parks and reserves, local roading and transport, sewerage and
storm water drainage, community development and other public works.
District councils are also largely self-funded through property rates, user-charges and
returns on investments.
Regional and district councils have the lead responsibility in regulating land-uses that
impact on biodiversity throughout New Zealand. They do so under broad direction of
the RMA, particularly through sections 5 – 7, which establish the purposes and
priorities for this. Of particular note is controversy surrounding the interpretation and
application of s6(c) of the Act which requires the protection of areas of significant
indigenous vegetation and significant habitats of indigenous fauna.
The collective operational revenue of regional and district councils is $3.3 billion. Of
this approximately 5% ($169 million) is spent on RMA policy and natural resource
management planning, 2.25% ($78 million) on pest management (although this is
mainly dog and other pet control) and an astonishing 11% ($378 million) on parks
management of an area estimated to be in excess of 172,292 ha (Local Government
New Zealand, 1999). However, it is important to note that formal gardens and sports
fields account for a large proportion of this.
Clearly district and regional councils are central players with highly significant levels
of funding being spent on activities directly relevant to the conservation of
biodiversity.
Maori lands: Some 4.7% of New Zealand’s land base is owned by iwi groups. As
noted the Nga Whenua Rahui has negotiated partnerships for the protection of
112,000 ha of Maori owned land at a cost of $14 million. Key issues relate to
establishing partnerships for the management of these lands in a way that recognises
land ownership and use rights.
Trusts and other bodies: a range of trusts and other bodies have an active interest in
biodiversity conservation. Key players include: the Queen Elizabeth II National
Trust; the Landcare Trust; the Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society; FederatedApplication to New Zealand
Conserving Biodiversity -– Institutions, Policies and Incentives
CSIRO Sustainable Ecosystems
62
Farmers of NZ; Fish and Game Councils; NZ Native Forests Restoration Trust; NZ
Landcare Trust; and Ducks Unlimited.
Of particular note is the QE II National Trust which has protected some 50,000 ha of
indigenous biodiversity on private land through negotiation of 1350 voluntary
conservation covenants. In addition the trust owns another 2000 ha of land with high
biodiversity values. The uptake of conservation covenants by landholders has
increased in recent years and the trust has not had the capacity to meet the demand of
landholders seeking to enter conservation covenants in recent years. It is important to
note that 98% of the covenants negotiated are in the lowland, semi-coastal or coastal
areas where the most significant threats to biodiversity exist and where other
programmes are less active. As discussed, it is in these areas where the voluntary
stewardship approach used by the trust is likely to be the most cost effective and
complement other government programmes aimed at conserving larger intact areas.
Approximately 3000 ha of private land are covenanted each year.
Given the range of responsibilities for management of biodiversity outlined above, all spheres
of government will need to be actively involved in the implementation of the NZ Biodiversity
Strategy.
Our consultations revealed a strong division between: direct central government involvement
primarily through management and extension of the formal conservation estate by DOC;
regional councils, via their natural resource management responsibilities; and, district
councils, via land use-planning and management.
There would appear to be a trend for each of these spheres of government to operate
independently, although the linkages between district and regional councils may be stronger
than those with central government. Several factors are driving this outcome.
•  The RMA and Biosecurity Act largely delegate responsibility for their
interpretation and implementation to regional and local scales. This is a key
strength in that responsibilities are clearly defined and natural resource
management can be planned for and integrated at an appropriate catchment
scale. However, delegation does not imply that central government can afford to
play a passive role particularly in regions with low capacity and/or willingness
to actively manage biodiversity values (see section 2.1.3).
•  Each sphere of government has control of its own taxation powers and other
revenue sources. This means that there is limited financial leverage between the
different spheres of government. In commenting on this paper MfE have noted
that financial leverage has been used to address other environmental priorities
although not biodiversity. The capacity to use financial leverage stands in
contrast to Australia where the imbalance in revenue-raising powers, where
central government is the beneficiary, means that financial grants are the key
mechanism for central government involvement in environmental policy.
•  The capacity to develop national policies and statements under key natural
resource management acts, including the Resource Management Act (RMA)
1991 and the Biosecurity Act 1993 to guide and direct regional policy
development has not generally been employed.
The development of a NZ Biodiversity Strategy runs somewhat across this trend as it is
seeking to facilitate a non-regulatory but coordinated national approach to biodiversity
management. This raises a number of important challenges and issues that require careful
consideration.Application to New Zealand




Integration is required at a number of levels.
First, linkages between on -and off-reserve conservation require further effort. It is important
to note that efforts to extend the formal reserve system to incorporate private land via
covenants and regional and district council reserves has been commendable, as has the
development of partnerships for Maori land management through the Nga Whenua Rahui
Fund.
However, there is little coordination between strategies for the protection of sites through the
reserve system and protection of other sites. Indeed there would appear to be conflicting
views on this issue. One view, expressed on several occasions by senior officials, is that if
further public funds are allocated they would be best directed at securing the protection of
larger contiguous areas through DOC, who have the professional skills and management
expertise to deliver conservation outcomes. A second view, most notably championed by the
QEII National Trust, notes that a formal reserve system is necessary but not sufficient to
secure biodiversity outcomes, noting that many of New Zealand’s threatened ecosystems
occur in small fragments on private land, particularly in lowland areas including riparian and
wetland systems.
The need to resolve this tension is perhaps best evidenced by current debate over the
interpretation and application of s6(c) of the RMA. It is clear that formal reservation of all
areas identified under s6(c) assessments is neither practical nor desirable. If not, what are the
appropriate mechanisms for their protection and who should bear the costs? These are key
questions being considered by the Ministerial Advisory Committee following comments on
the Bio-What report.
A first step is to record the status of key ecosystems across all land tenures. Adoption of the
concept of a Conservation Management Network (Section 2.2.2) would do much to facilitate
this process over time. It is noted that the regional strategic plans of the National Heritage
Fund represent a good starting point for this process.
Second, a related issue is coordination of the management of public lands. As has been noted,
regional and district councils are spending significant resources on reserve management for a
range of objectives including open space, recreation and conservation. Further, there are
undoubtedly many small areas of public land for which management responsibilities are
poorly defined. Local Government New Zealand, the peak body representing local
government, and DOC have now initiated reviews for some local reserves and some
rationalisation has occurred.
These concerns match experience in Australia where many significant areas of indigenous
biodiversity are found on vacant crown land. Experience would suggest that a methodical, but
given the size of the task, staged approach to reviewing land-use classifications should be
undertaken over about a five year time frame. The review could address both appropriate
land-use classification and appropriate management of selected sites. Revenue collected from
sale of sites could be targeted to securing appropriate management of other significant sites
identified through s6(c) and other biodiversity assessment processes.
Third, coordination is required at a regional scale to integrate biodiversity management with
other natural resource management strategies, particularly catchment and pest management.
Planning frameworks must ensure that advice provided to land managers is consistent with
meeting different natural resource management objectives concurrently. A key challenge here
is to move responses to biodiversity policy at a local scale beyond assessment of s6(c) sites to
develop landscape scale responses to natural resource management – this may, for example,
place increased emphasis on rehabilitation of riparian zones. Another challenge, discussed in
Section 5.3, is to ensure integrated delivery of government facilitation and grant programmes.Application to New Zealand
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Fourth, there is a need to integrate biodiversity values into strategic land-use zoning processes
at a district level to ensure lands of conservation value are appropriately zoned prior to
development pressures.
Policy Option 1 – Integrating approaches to biodiversity conservation
The framework of a Conservation Management Network be adopted to coordinate
management responses to biodiversity conservation across all land tenures.
•  Processes can be put in place to ensure biodiversity values are integrated into existing
natural resource management and statutory land-use planning processes;
•  Regional data-bases recording the status of and existing conservation efforts to manage
key ecosystems across all land tenures can be put in place;
•  A progressive review of public land classifications can be put in place with emphasis
placed on pragmatically resolving issues of regional and district land management
responsibilities;
•  Linkages can be made with the research community to ensure the development of
conservation priorities is undertaken on a scientific basis.
Clarification of expectations
A second set of issues relates to clarifying expectations between levels of government.
Regional and district councils have had difficulty in implementing requirements under s6(c)
because they have not had clear guidance on what would constitute areas of “significant
indigenous vegetation and significant habitats of indigenous fauna”. Further, it is unclear
whether regions are expected to provide regulatory certainty or whether they would be
allowed to adopt a voluntary approach.
An illustrative quote from a frustrated West Coast Planner:
Our notified plan made forestry a permitted activity. We have had seven appeals on the above
rules. One appellant lives on the Coast, the rest are from AWAY. Four government agencies
appeal despite my thinking plans are meant to in some way reflect the aspirations of the local
community. Even more bizarre is that MfE, DOC and MAF’s submissions are contradictory.
This example highlights a number of key issues. There is indeed a need for checks and
balances between local and national objectives. Sometimes the policy process becomes messy
– this is unavoidable but should be minimised. Where local and national objectives do not
coincide, clear decision making and conflict resolution processes are required. Finally, central
government requires a coordinated response to these issues.
This issue is likely to be compounded in the future as other elements of the RMA come into
the picture. The Bio-What report notes that requirements under the RMA include
requirements under s5 to “safeguard the life-supporting capacity of ecosystems as well as
water soil and air” and “avoiding, remedying or mitigating any adverse effects of activities on
the environment” with environment defined as: “ecosystems and their constituent parts, all
natural and physical resources, amenity values and the social, economic, aesthetic and cultural
conditions that affect those matters”. Further, s6 also requires preservation of the natural
character of wetlands, lakes and rivers. S7 goes on to specify further requirements
(Ministerial Advisory Committee, 2000 pg 18).
Options for clarifying expectations include:
•  codification of rules to define what a significant site is in terms of vegetation type,
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•  requiring approval for land clearing of any areas of indigenous biodiversity above a
certain size to be based on assessment of conservation value, with referral to central
government for sites above a certain size;
•  the capacity to accredit individual property plans as complying with regulatory
requirements making all actions consistent with that plan permitted activities;
•  definition of an outcome, such as “no net loss in the extent of areas of indigenous
biodiversity” within a defined period, with flexibility provided to regions in how
they meet these defined outcomes;
•  requirements for regions to develop regional plans which would then be accredited
as complying with the RMA – thus minimising the problem of government appeals
to the Environment Court.8
•  interim controls on clearing of indigenous vegetation until regionally specific
policies and plans can be developed; or
•  no regulation or central government guidance with encouragement through non-
regulatory and voluntary mechanisms.
Each of the options outlined above has been used in at least one Australian state (Dore,
Binning and Hayes, 1999). The analysis of institutional frameworks in section 2 would
suggest that an outcomes-based approach as outlined in the fourth or fifth options would, in
principle, be preferable, with regions then drawing on the full range of policy tools described
in this report to meet clearly defined outcomes over a three to five year time horizon. The key
challenges here are to define an appropriate outcome, to adequately resource non-regulatory
approaches and to address issues of transition. For example the objective of “no net loss in
extent” would defer issues of site quality, including pest management. Further, a mechanism
for calculating trade-offs between vegetation clearance and revegetation would be required.
The issue of whether a basic minimum standard, to halt inappropriate land clearing, should
also be put in place is more complex, particularly in the transition to more secure regional
approaches of the kind described above. A voluntary approach may be justified if land
clearing rates are insignificant and the issue is one of fostering positive management, not
regulating inappropriate land clearing. However, if clearing rates are high a voluntary
approach may be insufficient, as evidenced by clearing rates in Queensland outstripping
rehabilitation efforts across the whole of Australia. However, if there is insufficient
community will to enforce tight regulatory controls, as reflected through the political process,
then a regulatory approach may be counter productive.
A final issue is that of clarifying expectations of landholders. Irrespective of the pathway
chosen, increased resources will be required either: in the form of incentive payments for
voluntary conservation; or, in the form of transition payments to assist landholders in meeting
costs imposed by new regulations. The need for balance between eduction, incentives and
regulation as discussed in section 3 is highlighted.
It is beyond the scope of this short-term study to resolve this issue. Data on land clearing:
whether it is a significant issue and in which regions, appears not to be available. For
example, during consultations the issue of clearing indigenous vegetation to establish
industrial pine plantations by companies outside the voluntary NZ Forest Accord was raised
on a number of occasions. If this is true, resolution through adherence to a Forest Accord that
specifically addresses issues of plantation establishment and harvesting may be a more
acceptable and appropriate. The Tasmanian Forest Practices System provides a good model,
8 It is noted that the process through which plans would be accredited would require careful
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although it only addresses harvesting for commercial purposes and does not address issues of
plantation establishment.
A Ministerial Advisory Committee is currently looking at whether a National Policy
Statement under the RMA should be prepared and, if so, what it should address. As discussed
there are many issues to consider and difficult judgements to be made about the extent to
which regulation from central government is required. Irrespective of the pathway chosen the
following issues will need to be addressed:
•  Ultimately the process through which issues of land clearing and indigenous
biodiversity management will need to be resolved at a regional scale – through
inventory, assessment and the definition of agreed outcomes and implementation
programmes. Central government interventions should be targeted at achieving
this outcome with some national consistency in the shortest timeframe possible.
This will require resources to support integration regional planning;9
•  The need to include adopt a mix of education, incentive and regulatory
approaches in meeting regional objectives including the imperative of fostering
voluntary stewardship by private landholders, particularly for lowland coastal
and coastal ecological communities;
•  The establishment of monitoring and research programmes that account for
biodiversity values across both private and public land as proposed in policy
option 1;
•  If there is a need to impose interim controls requiring consent for land clearing
during the transition to regional policies and whether individual property
accreditation is a viable option; and
•  If there is a need to develop industry specific guidelines including, but not
limited to, plantation establishment.
Policy Option 2 – Clarifying roles and responsibilities
Consistent with the framework of the Resource Management Act 1991, clear responsibility
can be given to regional councils for the coordination of strategic planning for biodiversity
conservation in an integrated fashion with other natural resource management issues. This
would require increased commitment from all spheres of government over the next three to
five years.
•  There is an urgent need to facilitate and build the capacity of regions to successfully
integrate biodiversity management into their existing natural resource management
objectives.
•  Central government should actively monitor land clearing rates across New Zealand to
guide future policy development in this area.
The points made here are put forward as the observations of an outsider looking in. The
opportunity provided to reflect on these issues has been brief as the regulatory framework is
but one consideration of this study. Indeed, a key finding of our research is the need to
complement regulatory approach with social engagement, education and financial incentives.
Comment has been made because of the current status of this debate. The comments should
9 Experience with regional vegetation planning in Australia provides some powerful lessons. Those
state governments that have sought to prescribe outcomes have struggled to adequately resource
regional planning that can bring regulations into force in the years following the introduction of
clearing controls. The experience of NSW is particularly illustrative (Dore, Binning and Hayes, 1999).Application to New Zealand
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be considered as simply one input to the work of the Ministerial Advisory Committee which
is addressing these issues in a more comprehensive and consultative manner.
Building institutional capacity
A final issue associated with issues of governance is the issue of building the capacity of all
spheres of government to address biodiversity issues. Once again these issues are highlighted
in both The New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy and the Bio-What report.
The need for inventory, assessment and threat analysis highlighted in both the Biodiversity
Strategy and Bio-What are noted and will not be addressed in detail here. A short discussion
of the mechanisms through which institutional capacity in these areas could be increased is,
however, warranted.
A key issue is how the capacity of local institutions can be developed to address biodiversity
issues in more innovative ways that reduce the conflicts associated with prescriptive national
regulatory approaches. One successful approach in Australia has been to employ facilitators
with expertise in biodiversity planning and to provide access to contestable funds for local
governments to develop biodiversity programmes. It has been noted that the Taranaki Tree
Trust has adopted an approach similar to this in New Zealand.
As local government in New Zealand is predominately self funded it is desirable that access
to contestable funds be only used as a catalyst to establish programmes that become self-
funding after an establishment phase. Programmes could range from inventory and
assessment through to adoption of model incentive, education and local regulatory schemes.
A difficult issue to resolve here is the uneven distribution of revenue-raising capacity of
Councils. Some councils with significant biodiversity issues may not have the resources
required to address these issues. This issue is simply noted as a review of intergovernmental
funding arrangements for natural resource management and biodiversity is beyond the scope
of this study.
The Nature Heritage Fund is a contestable fund of the kind described above, and one to which
Councils already have access. However, this fund is specifically targeted at the protection of
priority sites. The proposal here is to establish a fund that specifically builds the capacity of
local government. Other organisations, including the QE II National Trust, have been working
with local governments for some time.
The issue of whether the proposed fund should be rolled in with any other incentive fund is
discussed in section 5.3. Finally, it is noted that considerable additional resources have been
allocated to biodiversity management in the 2000-2001 Budget. An important issue that
requires consideration is identifying where funding for the policy option outlined below
should be sourced.
Policy Option 3 – Building institutional capacity
Incentives that build institutional capacity will be required to give district and regional
Councils access to and the ability to implement the full suite of tools required to achieve the
outcomes established in the Biodiversity Strategy.
•  Small team of facilitators can be employed to provide advice and expertise on
biodiversity planning and programme design to local governments and non-government
organisations operating at a regional scale.
•  A contestable fund is established to which local governments can apply to implement
innovative programmes for biodiversity management. The programme would provide
establishment funding for 3 years after which the programmes would be required to
become self-funding.Application to New Zealand
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5.2.2 Engaging the private sector
Discussion with officials and stakeholders has revealed mixed views about the potential role
and capacity of the non-government sector. On the one hand, the potential for engagement of
wealthy individuals in purchasing large areas of indigenous biodiversity for conservation
purposes was highlighted. On the other, there was concern that resources could be spent
attempting to attract private interest and investment with little or no return because of the
“thin philanthropic market” in New Zealand.
A further issue related to outsourcing of the delivery of on-ground programmes for nature
conservation, including both management of public lands and the delivery of advice and
incentives to landholders. The potential and need to gain leverage of government funding was
noted on several occasions, as was the need to make programme delivery contestable to
promote innovation and efficiency in. However, this must be balanced against the significant
transaction costs that can be associated with engaging non-government players, particularly
when programme allocations are small.
There would appear to be minimal legal impediments to non-government involvement in
conservation activities. Department of Conservation officials have advised that there is no
impediment to the creation of private conservation trusts or to the non-government sector
accessing covenanting powers to secure investment in on-ground works for conservation on
private lands. Some government funding programmes, including the Nature Heritage Fund,
are contestable and allow for the private sector to bid for government funding. However, a
number of non-government organisations have commented that these funds are difficult to
access, particularly where devolved grant programmes or landholder facilitation are involved.
There may, however, be cultural impediments, with a strong view held that government
should be the central driver of conservation policy. Whilst this view is not questioned, care
needs to be taken to ensure government activity does not crowd out potential private sector
investment in this area. The proposal to initiate a focussed dialogue with business and
community leaders on this issue is a constructive one worthy of pursuing.
The impact of existing taxation arrangements on private conservation activities is less clear. It
has not been possible to undertake a comprehensive review of taxation arrangements. We
have had no advice on the taxation treatment of donations to environmental organisations or
the gifting of property for conservation purposes. It is expected that landholders managing
lands for conservation, where no other business activities are taking place, would be unable to
access business deductions for management costs, as is the case in Australia. It is assumed
that strong tax incentives for environmental philanthropy of the kind discussed in the body of
the report are yet to be considered in New Zealand. Consideration of the impact of the
taxation system on conservation represents a particular challenge. This is because there are
generally direct conflicts between tax policy and environmental policy. On the one hand, the
objective is to maintain a simple tax system that minimises special arrangements for particular
public policy objectives. On the other, taxation arrangements may act as an impediment to
investment in private conservation.
At district and regional scales access to property rate exemptions for covenanted land would
appear to be patchy. A particular issue raised is that under existing legislation rate exemptions
cannot be guaranteed beyond one financial year. This issue is worthy of closer investigation
although it would appear that many councils have established a precedent of providing
ongoing rate relief.
Another issue raised was barriers to foreign ownership of land. This requires consent of the
Overseas Investment Commission, which does not currently take account of potential gains in
terms of biodiversity conservation. It is recognised that foreign ownership of land raises
complex and difficult issues. However, ensuring that potential conservation benefits are taken
into account by the Overseas Investment Commission when considering proposals for private
ownership suggests they may be worthy of further consideration.Application to New Zealand
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The situation in New Zealand would appear to match that in Australia closely: first there is
considerable and growing willingness by private landholders to implement voluntary
conservation programmes on their land, including entering conservation covenants; and
second, the scope for engagement with the non-landholding community, particularly urban
New Zealanders, is largely untested and has some risk associated with its development. The
issues associated with engaging the private sector are complex and may at times lead to
conflicts in public policy. Further, there are those who would prefer to see conservation
programmes retained exclusively within government agencies.
However, to counter these arguments is the view that the conservation of biodiversity must
ultimately be a social responsibility between government, business and community sectors in
partnership with private landholders who are ultimately the on-ground delivers of
conservation outcomes. The New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy endorses this view – hence it
is expected that more effective engagement of the non-government sector would be perceived
as a high priority for government.
Draft Policy Option 4 – Engaging the non-government Sector
Given the emergent nature of the role of the non-government sector and private investment in
conservation activities in New Zealand there is a need to review existing arrangements, to
identify and address impediments to private investment and to foster opportunities for large-
scale partnerships which deliver effective leverage of scarce public sector funding.
Consideration could be given to:
•  increasing support for voluntary conservation programmes to meet the demand of
landholders wishing to enter conservation covenants;
•  establishing a roundtable between relevant ministers and community and business
leaders to review existing arrangements and facilitate engagement of the non-
government sector, with particular focus on urban New Zealanders;
•  reviewing taxation arrangements to provide positive incentives for environmental
philanthropy and the creation of private conservation reserves; and
•  review property rates to confirm the capacity of local government to provide ongoing
exemptions to land covered by a conservation covenant.Application to New Zealand




There would appear to be strong support for the need to use a suite of policy instruments
covering education and motivation (people), financial incentives (finance) and property right
measures (security).
A consistent message from the consultations was that too much emphasis has been placed on
regulation and that insufficient attention has been paid to facilitating landholder stewardship
through voluntary participation in conservation programmes. Notable exceptions to this
general rule lie in a number of local government programmes and in the operation of the QEII
National Trust and the contestable funds administered by DOC.
Outlined below are key findings on the use of policy instruments arising from the
consultations.
5.3.1 People
Bio-What and the Biodiversity Strategy place great emphasis on engaging landholders and the
broader community in participating in on-ground works for the conservation of biodiversity.
Further, interviews conducted with officials and landholders have revealed a strong
preference by many to focus on a facilitative and voluntary approach to biodiversity
conservation.
Biodiversity conservation will ultimately require all land managers, public and private, to be
active stewards of the land they manage. Australian experience would suggest that one-on-
one dialogue through locally-based facilitation officers who are employed at arms length to
government, tied to appropriate cost-sharing incentives, is the most effective mechanism for
delivering on-ground conservation outcomes.
Individual facilitation is costly and must be carefully targeted. Critical issues surround who
should deliver facilitation services, what objectives they should be targeted at, and what
linkages to government expertise are required.
In summary, a successful facilitation programme would take account of the following needs.
•  employment of facilitators who understand the local community and the farming
systems in place within their region;
•  services should be independent of government regulation and, preferably, be
delivered at arms length from government;
•  services should have close connection to and be aligned with strategic objectives
of central government agencies (DOC, MAF), regional and district councils;
•  services should be able to communicate with landholders about the full range of
government programmes relating to sustainable land management including
inter alia responses to pests, weeds, catchment management and biodiversity;
•  individual facilitators should be given delegation to facilitate access to all
government funding and incentive programmes based on agreed guidelines for on-
ground works.
The organisations closest to meeting these criteria at the present time would appear to be the
QEII National Trust and the Landcare Trust.
To develop such a facilitation network it is recommended that bids be sought on a regional
basis with selection to be determined between representatives from central, regional andApplication to New Zealand
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district government for each region. The provision of facilitation/support networks would be
integral to any proposed partnership or statutory agreement with regional councils for delivery
of the outcomes of the biodiversity strategy.
It is noted that the adequacy of existing extension services would need to be reviewed prior to
moving to establish a new facilitation service. This review is beyond the scope of this study,
although several officials noted that traditional agricultural extension by government agencies
has diminished markedly in the last 15 years. On the other hand, organisations such as QEII
National Trust have worked hard to establish effective networks in rural communities. The
objective of the review would be to assess the adequacy of existing services and evaluate how
integration between different facilitation services with different objectives can be most
effectively achieved.
Other key issues raised during consultations relate to education of the general community.
New Zealanders’ are generally proud of their natural environment. However, there is a need
for greater understanding of the linkages between natural and human systems and the urgency
of the task in managing biodiversity. Key opportunities lie in engaging decision makers
through events such as parliamentary briefings and the development of a biodiversity and
schools programme. These are already key commitments under Theme 8 of the Biodiversity
Strategy.
Policy Option 5 – Facilitating landholder stewardship
In order to achieve greater uptake of biodiversity conservation programmes by land managers
it is recommended that a network landholder facilitators be established to provide advice and
facilitate access to incentives for on-ground works.
•  A review of existing extension services available to landholders is required to determine
how existing resources can be most effectively targeted to a more integrated service
across all public policy objectives, including biodiversity.
•  Where new services are required, the provision of these services should be contestable
and preferably delivered at arms length from government.
•  Facilitation networks should be closely aligned to any financial incentives (see finance).Application to New Zealand
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5.3.2 Finance – Cost Sharing Incentives
Implications for New Zealand - Outcome of Consultations
Funding provided by governments and the non-government sector for conservation reserves is
shown in figure 10, and funding for sustain land management, including pest and weed
management is shown in figure 11.10
Figure 10 – Funding for public and private conservation reserves
Figure 11 – Funding for Sustainable Land Management
10 Note these diagrams are a schematic representation of existing funding structures. It is understood
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The figures are split in two to distinguish between funding sources, scaled from local to
national, and delivery mechanisms, scaled from low to high funding. Further, the objectives
of the funding sources are distributed along a spectrum ranging from sustainable production
to protection of large intact formal conservation reserves. The diagrams are a schematic
representation. Of course some of the funding and delivery mechanisms are relevant at
number of scales in the diagram. For example, regional and district reserves may be expected
to cover the full range of on-ground outcomes ranging from landscape health to large intact
conservation reserves.
The diagram reveals that there is some level activity is taking place across the full spectrum of
desired outcomes. Particular highlights drawn attention to during the consultations are:
•  the impressive network of public conservation reserves owned and administered
at national, regional and district scales;
•  the role of the Nature Heritage Fund and Nga Whenua Rahui Fund in working in
partnership with governments and land managers to secure protection of high
priority sites to meet the objectives of the Protected Area Network;
•  the fragmentation between programmes run by different government agencies;
•  the role of regional and district councils in managing and funding conservation
through a large network of local and regional reserves for a range of objectives
including open space, recreation, conservation and landscape amenity;
•  the emerging and potential role of regional and district councils in promoting
sustainable natural resource management and facilitating nature conservation
outcomes on private land through a range of innovative programmes.
•  the fundamental role of independent organisations including the QE II National
Trust and the Landcare Trust in building partnerships with landholders.
In summary, there is some activity across the full spectrum of desired outcomes ranging from
exclusive conservation to management of biodiversity in a production landscape. However, a
critical issue is whether a balanced portfolio of funding mechanisms is in place across this
spectrum. The work of the QE II and Landcare Trust is currently occurring on a modest scale.
This is largely due to limited funding. The Bio-What report notes that:
“Existing mechanisms are worthwhile, but far less effective than they should be, due to
significant funding shortfalls”.
From the consultations it would appear that the Nature Heritage Fund and Nga Whenua Rahui
appear well designed to meet the needs and objectives of the Protected Area Network. There
is, however, no equivalent national mechanism for facilitating landholder engagement and
protection of indigenous biodiversity that falls outside the strict requirements of these funds.
Indeed, as noted in the main body of the report, government facilitation programmes are
failing to meet this need. If land managers are to be convinced that natural areas on private
land are of value an additional mechanism to support smaller scale grants directed at
protection and management, for example pest control, will be required.
Such a fund could be achieved in one of two ways: the scope of existing funds could be
broadened; or, a new fund established. Given the extremely focussed nature of the Nature
Heritage Fund it is proposed that a separate fund be established. If established the design of
such a fund would need to take account of the following attributes:
•  a focus on funding projects aimed at contributing to the objective of conserving
biodiversity on private lands;
•  be closely linked to other existing funds to ensure consistency in operation and
strong linkage between on and off-reserve conservation management;Application to New Zealand
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•  give priority to projects with the potential to either: build institutional capacity at a
local scale, or catalyse further on-ground work to protect or rehabilitate indigenous
biodiversity in strategic locations; and
•  be contestable with funding available to individuals, community groups, non-
government organisations and district and regional councils for the purpose of
establishing devolved programmes (see draft policy option 3).
The need for such a fund needs to be debated given the mixed objectives for implementation
of the Biodiversity Strategy discussed earlier. However, a strong conclusion can be reached
that a more flexible fund of this kind is required if the general landholder community is to be
successfully engaged in biodiversity conservation. The objective would be to achieve balance
between the mix of regulatory (security), facilitation (people), and incentives (finance) tools
discussed in section 3 of this report.
Once again it is important to note that the issues of who should manage such a fund and
where its budget should be sourced from are of critical importance. It is unclear whether the
new commitments to biodiversity announced in the last budget will be able to be redirected to
activities of this kind. The resolution of this issue is beyond the scope of this study.
Policy Option 6 – Incentives fund
To support the transition to sustainable management of indigenous biodiversity on private
land a new contestable incentive fund be established or the scope of existing funds be
broadened.
•  The fund would be linked to existing funds aimed at securing protection of high priority
lands for the Conservation Management Network (policy option 1).
•  The fund would also provide catalytic funding for the establishment of new programmes
by regional and district councils (see draft policy option 3).Application to New Zealand




The issues surrounding national scale regulatory and institutional structures have been
discussed in section 5.2, focusing on the need to clarify expectations and resolve the
mechanisms through which the conservation of indigenous biodiversity on private land can be
secured.
If an outcomes-based approach is adopted and primary responsibility for resolving this issue
remains with regional and district councils, there will be a need to identify and broadly
communicate the full range of options for establishing effective regulatory structures at the
regional scale. Section 3.3 of the report identifies a range of tools that can potentially be used
to plan for and regulate land-use at local scales. The role of strategic planning in securing
appropriate land-use zoning ahead of development pressures is noted, as are mechanisms for
offsetting the impacts of development and rezoning land. The experiences of local
government reported by Local Government New Zealand reveal that a number of councils are
successfully addressing this controversial issue including linking of regulatory mechanisms
with education, facilitation and financial incentives.
The need to build institutional capacity is highlighted in draft policy option 3. A further step
could be taken by developing resource materials of best practice and also developing model
planning provisions for local government. These would need to be coupled with model
facilitation and incentive programmes in order to promote an appropriate balance between
statutory and non-statutory mechanisms.
At a property scale, covenanting programmes through both DOC and the QE II National Trust
appear to be well-established and working effectively. Strategic partnerships could be formed
with local governments, farming organisations and other non-government organisations to
ensure that potential to use voluntary property-based mechanisms is maximised.
A related issue is the potential to use less binding voluntary mechanisms as a first step to
achieving improved landholder stewardship of areas of indigenous biodiversity. Options
include:
•  fixed term contracts for specific works such as fencing or pest control – in
Australia such agreements are usually for a period of 10 years; and
•  purely voluntary agreements such as available through the Land for Wildlife
programme described in section 3.1.
A final suggestion would be to consider options for accrediting individual property plans as
meeting the requirements of regional and/or national regulation. In this case, works consistent
with the property plan could take place, creating a mechanism for resolving difficult cases
that do not easily fit within regional framework. It is noted, however, that such an approach
must be carefully targeted and complemented by appropriate rules at a regional scale to
achieve consistency. The administrative cost of negotiating individual agreements is also
likely to be high.
Policy Option 7 – Model regional regulation, incentive and facilitation programmes
To facilitate improved design and acceptance of regulation at regional and local scales, best
practice and model programmes can be developed and widely disseminated to all local
governments to facilitate early uptake of new and innovative approaches to biodiversity
management.
•  The model programmes could be tied to the capacity building and catalytic incentives
fund described in policy options 3 and 6.Application to New Zealand
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Policy Option 8 – Broadening the suite of management agreements
To facilitate greater voluntary uptake of property agreements and covenanting programmes a
range of fixed term and non-binding agreements can be developed and made available to
landholders.
•  Fixed term agreements (10 years) may be appropriate for catalytic funding for improved
management such as fencing or pest control.
•  A non-binding programme modeled on the Land for Wildlife programme may encourage
greater landholder uptake and stewardship.Application to New Zealand
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5.4 MONITORING AND ACCOUNTABILITY
A key issue raised in consultations was: how to monitor and evaluate performance in
implementing The New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy. The need for an adaptive approach to
management and implementation are discussed under Theme 10 and Part Four: Strategic
Priorities and Implementation of the strategy.
Likewise an adaptive approach has been highlighted, albeit briefly, in this report. The
challenge remains: how do we measure progress given that the strategy is a large
comprehensive document that will take years to implement? To address this issue the strategy
identifies those areas of action that should be given highest priority in the next five years.
This report has primarily focussed on the following sub-set of priority areas identified in the
strategy: better governance, community participation and learning; sustaining indigenous
biodiversity in privately-managed areas; and, enhancing protected areas and prospects for
threatened species. In doing so it has highlighted the need for targeted actions in the following
areas:
•  Building institutional capacity;
•  Engaging the non-government sector;
•  Facilitating greater landholder and community awareness and participation;
•  Strategically investing in on-ground works.
Measuring the outcome of these actions is not a trivial task. For example, how do we measure
landholder and community awareness - by the level of on-ground action or by surveys of
attitudes?
The objective is to develop more effective strategies and to secure greater commitment by all
stakeholders - government and non-government - over time. This requires careful articulation
of what each programme is seeking to achieve, over what timeframe and what the indicator of
success will be. It is beyond the scope of this study to develop appropriate indicators of this
kind. It is, however, suggested that monitoring will need to occur in at least the following
areas:
•  Biophysical Indicators: for example changes in the extent and quality of areas
of indigenous biodiversity;
•  Institutional Indicators: for example, the level of activity and effectiveness of
district and regional Council programmes;
•  Awareness Indicators: for example, the level of understanding of landholders,
decision makers and the broader community; and
•  Behavioural Indicators: for example, the uptake of voluntary conservation
programmes by landholders.
Care must be taken to ensure that the success of programmes is measured over an appropriate
timeframe. For example section 3 of this report, which outlined a number of case studies,
noted that successful regional programmes - based on a balance between eduction,
information, incentives and regulation - can take up to 10 years to establish and achieve their
primary objectives.
For this reason the report is concluded by returning to the need to interpret the objectives,
themes, strategies and actions of the Biodiversity Strategy and then develop pragmatic
programmes that can be measured in the context of their specific objectives and expected
outcomes over a budget cycle. Thus monitoring is required at two levels: first of the overallApplication to New Zealand
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strategy; and second of the specific programmes funded under the strategy to gauge their
success in the context of their own objectives and funding over a budget cycle.




The acronym is RAM.
Figure 11 provides a simple framework for linking short and long term objectives. Priority
issues are identified based on existing information on the state of and threats to biodiversity.
Programmes are designed that address social, economic and environmental aspects of these
issues. Monitoring and auditing provides guidance on those programmes that are successful
and justify further funding and those that require reconsideration. Information flows are
highlighted as flowing from both the monitoring programme but also from new information
collected through ongoing research.
The outcome is that planning, action and monitoring can take place in parallel in order to
facilitate learning and adaptation on a continuous basis.
Figure 11 – Adaptive implementation of the New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy
Draft Policy Option 9 – Measuring success
To ensure that scarce funds are invested wisely it is recommended that all programmes funded
under the Biodiversity Strategy have clear project objectives and performance indicators
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